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ESSAY 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, HISTORICAL PRACTICE, AND 
LEGAL CONSTRAINT 
Curtis A. Bradley* & Trevor W. Morrison** 
The scope of the President’s legal authority is determined in part by 
historical practice. This Essay aims to better understand how such 
practice-based law might operate as a constraint on the presidency. In 
part because of the limited availability of judicial review in this area, 
some commentators have suggested that presidential authority has 
become “unbounded” by law and is now governed only or primarily by 
politics. At the same time, there has been growing skepticism about the 
ability of the familiar political checks on presidential power to work in 
any systematic or reliable fashion. Whether and how practice-based law 
might constrain the President are thus vital questions. As the Essay 
explains, no examination of those questions can succeed without careful 
specification of what legal constraint entails and how it relates to 
distinct but related phenomena like genuine disagreement about the 
content of the law. After attempting such specification, the Essay 
identifies various internal and external causal mechanisms through 
which law, including practice-based law, could constrain the President. 
The Essay argues, among other things, that one way that law might 
operate as a constraint is through the simple fact that issues of 
presidential power are publicly criticized and defended in legal terms. 
The Essay concludes by suggesting some avenues of possible empirical 
research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Presidential power in the United States is determined in part by his-
torical practice. Especially when the text of the Constitution is unclear or 
does not specifically address a particular question, the way in which the 
government has operated over time can provide what Justice Frankfurter 
famously called a constitutional “gloss” on presidential power.1 This gloss 
often develops without significant judicial review. A variety of justiciability 
limitations—including the general disallowance of legislative standing, 
ripeness considerations, and the political question doctrine—are 
regularly invoked by courts as a basis for declining to resolve issues of 
presidential power, especially when individual rights are not directly 
implicated.2 This has been particularly true in the area of foreign affairs, 
concerning issues such as the initiation of war, the use of “executive 
agreements,” and the termination of international commitments.3 Even 
                                                                                                                 
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued 
to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents 
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power 
part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ 
vested in the president by § 1 of Art. II.”). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. 
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012) 
(describing and assessing role of historical practice in determining distribution of 
constitutional authority between President and Congress); infra Part I.A. 
2. See infra Part I.B. 
3. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 420–21. 
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when courts do get involved, they often defer to longstanding practice 
when discerning the President’s constitutional (and statutory) authority.4 
The customary nature of much of the law governing presidential 
power, together with the typically limited role of the courts, might in-
spire doubts about whether the apparent norms in this area truly are 
legal norms capable of constraining the President. Without either a clear 
text or an authoritative adjudicator, the argument might run, the 
President’s authority is simply the product of the push and pull of the 
political process. To the extent that there appear to be stable 
arrangements with respect to this authority, they might simply be “non-
normative equilibria” with no authoritative status. If so, any apparent 
consistency between presidential behavior and purported legal norms 
might simply be the result of political and policy considerations, not any 
constraint imposed by law. In recent years, a number of influential legal 
scholars have made claims of precisely this sort.5 Other leading scholars, 
meanwhile, take the proposition that the President is constrained by law 
as irrefutably correct.6 Yet specifying precisely how the President might be 
constrained by law is anything but straightforward,7 and it becomes all 
the more difficult once one appreciates the practice-based nature of 
much of the law of presidential power.  
The relationship between law and presidential power is not merely a 
matter of academic debate. Whether, how, and to what extent 
presidential decisionmaking is subject to legal constraint is a central issue 
in the practice of modern government, as illustrated by two recent 
episodes. First, in March 2011, the Obama Administration initiated 
military operations against Libya without congressional authorization, 
and then continued them past the statutory sixty-day limit set forth in the 
War Powers Resolution. Critics treated this episode as evidence that the 
executive branch did not take seriously constitutional and statutory limits 
                                                                                                                 
4. See infra Part I.A. Although the principal focus of this Essay is on the 
constitutional law of presidential power, we also consider various statutory regimes as well. 
Historical practice informs presidential power under certain federal statutes as well as 
under the Constitution, and questions about the law’s constraining effect can arise in both 
contexts. 
5. E.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2010) 
[hereinafter Ackerman, Decline]; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive 
Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, The 
Executive Unbound]. These and related arguments are discussed at greater length infra 
Part I.C.  
6. E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 975, 979 
(2009) [hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Constraints] (“[T]he thought that officials 
holding constitutionally constituted offices might be wholly unconstrained by the 
Constitution proves incoherent.”). 
7. Cf. id. (“The most important question is not whether the Constitution constrains, 
but how.”). 
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on the use of military force.8 Despite a low likelihood that courts would 
resolve the dispute, however, the Obama Administration offered public 
legal justifications, based heavily on arguments from historical practice, 
for both the initial deployment of military force in Libya and its 
continuation past the sixty-day point.9 The felt need of the executive 
branch to justify itself in legal terms might be puzzling if the law were not 
playing any constraining role, but it is difficult to discern precisely what 
that role might have been. 
Second, in the summer of 2011, a confrontation developed between 
the Obama Administration and Republican leaders in Congress over 
whether to raise the statutory debt ceiling to accommodate the 
government’s increased borrowing. When a legislative extension of the 
ceiling appeared unlikely, some commentators suggested, based on 
either novel constitutional arguments or pure policy grounds, that the 
President could and should unilaterally exceed the debt ceiling.10 Others 
insisted that such unilateral action would be unconstitutional because it 
would usurp Congress’s constitutional authority “[t]o borrow [m]oney 
on the credit of the United States.”11 President Obama did not attempt to 
address the issue unilaterally and instead continued to seek a legislative 
extension of the ceiling, which he ultimately obtained. Nor did the 
President attempt or even threaten a unilateral extension when the issue 
resurfaced in late 2012 and early 2013 in connection with the so-called 
“fiscal cliff,” by which time such an action appeared to be off the table 
altogether. It might be that the President felt constrained not to pursue a 
unilateral extension by legal concerns about such a course of action, but 
it is also possible that political considerations would have driven the 
President to a similar decision.12 In this context too, then, the role of law 
is unclear. 
Episodes like these underscore the importance of thinking carefully 
not just about the general question whether the President is constrained 
by law, but more particularly about what it means to say that the 
President is so constrained, and how such constraints operate. On issues 
of executive power unlikely to come before the courts, one familiar 
idea—espoused by James Madison in The Federalist Papers—is that 
members of Congress have sufficient personal motivations and 
professional resources to protect Congress’s institutional prerogatives 
                                                                                                                 
8. See infra notes 168–170 and accompanying text. The actions taken in Libya are 
more fully discussed in Part III.D. 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 150–151. 
10. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
12. For a fuller discussion of the debt ceiling and fiscal cliff issues, see infra notes 80–
86 and accompanying text. 
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from executive incursions.13 A number of scholars have concluded, how-
ever, that such checking is not as consistent or robust as is often assumed, 
and that whether Congress curbs presidential power depends more often 
on partisan political considerations or situation-specific policy objections 
than on any systematic effort to protect institutional prerogatives.14 If 
Congress is not as reliable a check on presidential power as Madison and 
others envisioned, there is arguably a greater need for other mechanisms 
of constraint in this area, including legal constraints. In the absence of 
judicial review, however, it is fair to ask how the legal constraints might 
operate.  
To the extent that a particular question of presidential power is 
recognized as a legal question, it is virtually inevitable that lawyers some-
where within the executive branch will provide advice on the question. 
On significant legal questions of presidential power, the lawyers will likely 
include individuals within the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC), which advises the White House and other executive 
departments on the legality of proposed executive programs and 
actions.15 Offices like OLC thus might provide part of the answer to the 
question of how, in the absence of judicial review or consistent congres-
sional checking, legal constraints on the President could operate. But in 
the aftermath of controversies surrounding some of OLC’s reasoning in 
the war on terror, including in the so-called “torture memos” in the early 
years of the Bush Administration, some scholars have come to doubt that 
OLC (or any other executive branch legal office) imposes genuine legal 
limits on the President.16  
                                                                                                                 
13. See The Federalist No. 51, at 321–22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the 
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the 
others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”). 
14. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 438–47 (describing various problems 
with Madisonian assumption about interbranch rivalry and summarizing literature); see 
also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 671 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment] 
(“[A]ll indications are that political ‘ambition counteracting ambition’ has failed to serve 
as a self-enforcing safeguard for the constitutional structures of federalism and separation 
of powers in the way that Madison seems to have envisioned.”); Daryl J. Levinson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2324–25 
(2006) (“[T]he political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with 
party than with branch . . . . [P]arty is likely to be the single best predictor of political 
agreement and disagreement.”). 
15. See infra notes 32–38 and accompanying text (describing OLC’s principal 
functions). 
16. See infra notes 87, 101. Some of the criticisms of an Obama Administration white 
paper concerning the legality of targeted killings, which was leaked to the press in early 
2013, were reminiscent of the criticisms of the torture memos. See, e.g., Scott Shane & 
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This Essay seeks to better frame the question of how law might con-
strain the President. Although we are not the first to focus on the 
relationship between law and presidential authority, our approach is 
more systematic than prior treatments. In addition, unlike some 
approaches, we treat law and politics as overlapping and interactive 
rather than as mutually distinct considerations. Thus, instead of 
inquiring whether politics or law constrains the President in a particular 
context, our approach identifies mechanisms by which politics and law 
operate in either reinforcing or countervailing ways. We also make two 
substantive contributions. First, building on our prior work, we explain 
how the practice-based nature of the law in this area—a feature not 
emphasized by others writing on the topic—poses particular challenges 
for any claim that the President is constrained by law. Second, we identify 
and explore a mechanism of potential constraint that has not been dis-
cussed extensively in the literature: the constraint associated with legal 
dialogue itself. 
Importantly, we make no claim in this Essay about the sufficiency of 
any constraint that law currently imposes on the presidency.  Whether 
the President is adequately constrained by law depends, first, on a 
substantive judgment about the appropriate scope of presidential power, 
and, second, on an empirical assessment of whether the law in fact keeps 
the President within those bounds. Both of those questions are beyond 
the scope of this Essay. Consequently, our analysis may not provide much 
comfort to those who are concerned about the growth of presidential 
power or about perceived presidential abuses. But one cannot meaning-
fully engage the normative question of how much the law ought to 
constrain the President without first having a clear sense of what such 
constraint might entail in an area where the law is deeply informed by 
practice, and how the constraint might operate. Our aim is to make 
headway on those conceptual and analytical questions.  In doing so, we 
seek to provide a basis for greater precision when making claims or 
raising concerns in this area, and to highlight potential mechanisms of 
legal constraint that might otherwise go unnoticed. 
Part I describes the law governing presidential authority and how 
this law is heavily informed by historical practice. It also explains some of 
the limits on judicial review in this area, and notes how commentators on 
both the right and left have charged that the President is not meaning-
fully constrained by law. Part II considers in some detail what it might 
mean to say that the President is constrained by law. As this Part shows, 
no examination of whether law constrains the President can succeed 
without careful specification of what constraint entails and how it relates 
to distinct but related phenomena like genuine disagreement about the 
                                                                                                                 
Charlie Savage, Report on Targeted Killing Whets Appetite for Less Secrecy, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 5, 2013, at A11. 
2013] LEGAL CONSTRAINT 1103 
  
content of the law. Part III identifies various internal and external causal 
mechanisms through which practice-based law could constrain the 
President. Among other things, this Part explains that one way that law 
might constrain the President is through the simple fact that issues of 
presidential power are publicly criticized and defended in legal terms. 
This Essay concludes by noting some of the obstacles to determining 
empirically the extent to which legal dialogue or any other mechanism 
operates as a constraint on the President, and by identifying some 
possible avenues of future research.  
I. LAW AND THE PRESIDENCY 
A vast array of law—constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and judge-
made—is relevant to the executive branch. The specific focus of this 
Essay is on the law, especially the constitutional law, governing 
presidential authority. This Part describes the prevalence of practice-
based argumentation in decisions and debates concerning this body of 
law. It also considers some of the limitations on judicial review in this 
area. Finally, this Part explains how the combination of unwritten norms 
and limited judicial review can lead to skepticism about the extent to 
which the President is constrained by law as opposed to mere politics. 
A. Historical Gloss and Presidential Power 
Reliance on historical practice is a mainstay of decisionmaking and 
debates concerning the scope of presidential power.17 In part this is a 
function of the limited guidance provided by the constitutional text. Un-
like Article I of the Constitution, which contains a long list of 
congressional powers, Article II sets forth relatively few specific 
presidential powers. The President is made the Commander in Chief of 
the armed forces, but the constitutional text does not explain what this 
authority entails.18 The President has the power to make treaties and to 
appoint various officials, but those powers are shared with the Senate.19 
Other clauses in Article II, such as the provisions about receiving 
ambassadors and taking care that the laws are faithfully executed, argua-
                                                                                                                 
17. Examples include debates over the initiation of military hostilities, the conclusion 
of executive agreements, and the removal of executive officers. For a detailed discussion of 
these examples, see Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 461–85; see also, e.g., Louis 
Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President 19 (5th ed. 2007) 
(“Custom is a source of executive power—particularly when Congress fails to challenge 
and check.”); William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers 2 (1916) 
(“Precedents from previous administrations and from previous Congresses create an 
historical construction of the extent and limitations of their respective powers, aided by 
the discussions arising in a conflict of jurisdictions between them.”). 
18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
19. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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bly sound more like obligations than powers.20 Some scholars contend 
that the first sentence of Article II, which states that “[t]he executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,”21 
implicitly grants the President a broad range of powers, but this claim is 
controversial, and, in any event, it highlights the text’s lack of 
specificity.22  
Responding in part to the limited textual guidance in Article II, 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in the Youngstown steel seizure 
case famously emphasized the importance of historical practice to the 
interpretation of presidential power. As he put it: 
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, 
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of 
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 
“executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.23 
In other decisions, the full Supreme Court has endorsed the significance 
of such practice-based “gloss.” 
Consider, for example, Dames & Moore v. Regan.24 The issue there 
was whether Presidents Carter and Reagan had the authority, as part of 
their resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis, to transfer billions of dollars 
in claims by U.S. citizens against Iran to a new arbitral body being estab-
lished in The Hague. In concluding that the Presidents had this 
authority, the Court noted that “the United States has repeatedly 
exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals 
against foreign countries” and that “there has . . . been a longstanding 
practice of settling such claims by executive agreement without the 
                                                                                                                 
20. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”). 
21. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
22. For debate over the implications of the Article II Vesting Clause, compare 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 
111 Yale L.J. 231, 234 (2001) (arguing Vesting Clause grants President “a ‘residual’ foreign 
affairs power”), with Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism 
and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 551–52 (2004) (challenging claim that Vesting 
Clause grants President substantive powers). The extent to which historical practice is 
viewed as relevant to issues of separation of powers will of course be affected by one’s 
constitutional methodology, and strict originalists in particular are both less likely to find 
it relevant and more likely to find the constitutional text to be determinate. See Bradley & 
Morrison, supra note 1, at 424–25, 431–32; Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 
126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 75, 81 (2013), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol1
26_lacroix.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
23. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
24. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
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advice and consent of the Senate.”25 The Court further emphasized that 
“the practice of settling claims continues today” and that Congress had 
acquiesced in this practice, both by enacting supporting framework legis-
lation and by “consistently fail[ing] to object . . . even when it has had an 
opportunity to do so.”26 
Historical practice is also an important component of the canonical 
three-tiered framework for assessing presidential power that Justice 
Jackson articulated in his Youngstown concurrence. Under that frame-
work, the President’s power is at its highest when supported by express or 
implied congressional authorization, in an intermediate “zone of 
twilight” when Congress has said nothing, and at its lowest when 
Congress has expressly or implicitly prohibited the action in question.27 
Historical practice is potentially relevant in each of these categories. It 
can help an interpreter determine whether there is implicit congres-
sional support or opposition for purposes of the first and third 
categories.28 It is also potentially relevant to whether a presidential power 
is exclusive and thus valid even under the third category.29 Perhaps most 
obviously, it can play a large role in the intermediate zone, in which the 
President and Congress “may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain.”30 Indeed, as Justice Jackson noted, congres-
sional inaction in the face of presidential activity “may sometimes, at least 
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent pres-
idential responsibility.”31 
Nonjudicial actors also frequently reference historical practice when 
making arguments relating to presidential power. This is certainly true of 
the work of OLC, which provides authoritative legal advice to the execu-
tive branch based on its best view of the law.32 OLC routinely issues 
                                                                                                                 
25. Id. at 679. 
26. Id. at 680–82 & n.10; see also, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 
(2003) (concluding President had constitutional authority to settle international law 
claims “[g]iven the fact that the practice goes back over 200 years, and has received 
congressional acquiescence throughout its history”); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 
689 (1929) (noting, in case involving question about operation of President’s veto 
authority, that “[l]ong settled and established practice is a consideration of great weight in 
a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character”). But cf. Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (declining to allow presidential memorandum to displace 
state law because, among other things, “[t]he President’s Memorandum is not supported 
by a ‘particularly longstanding practice’ of congressional acquiescence, . . . but rather is 
what the United States itself has described as ‘unprecedented action’” (citation omitted)). 
27. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
28. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 419. 
29. See id. at 421–22. 
30. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
31. Id. 
32. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1688, 1713–15 
(2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism] (reviewing Ackerman, Decline, 
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opinions relating to issues of presidential power, and those opinions fre-
quently refer to historical practice. To take a prominent recent example 
mentioned in the Introduction, in 2011 OLC relied heavily on a series of 
past presidential uses of military force, in which it claimed Congress had 
acquiesced, to support its conclusion that President Obama had the con-
stitutional authority to conduct military operations in Libya without con-
gressional authorization.33 Another recent example is OLC’s analysis of 
the applicability of executive privilege to certain Justice Department 
documents sought by the House Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform as part of its investigation into a law enforcement 
operation known as “Fast and Furious.”34 OLC’s analysis relied heavily on 
past assertions of executive privilege, as well as the rationales proffered to 
justify those assertions, to conclude that the documents in question were 
covered by the privilege.35  
To be sure, there is some variation in precisely how OLC invokes his-
torical practice. For example, its Libya opinion cited historical practice to 
establish “the two political branches’ practical understanding . . . of their 
respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense,”36 
whereas its executive privilege analysis cited historical practice to 
establish a consistent executive branch position over time, without assert-
ing any agreement by Congress.37 Careful normative assessment of those 
                                                                                                                 
supra note 5); see also Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside 
the Bush Administration 38–39 (2007) (noting OLC’s success depends on ability to 
“preserve its fidelity to the law while at the same time finding a way, if possible, to approve 
presidential actions”). 
33. See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, (Apr. 1, 2011) 
[hereinafter Krass Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/auth
ority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “the historical 
practice of presidential military action without congressional approval”). For a critique of 
OLC’s reasoning, see Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on the 
Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, Harvard Nat’l Security J.F. 1, 3–4 (2011), http: 
//harvardnsj.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Forum_Glennon_Final-Version.pdf (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (contending “[i]n many of the precedents that provide 
the ‘historical gloss’ on which OCL so heavily relies, Congress objected” and many of them 
were not on point). This issue is distinct from whether the operation constituted 
“hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution. For discussion of that question, see infra 
Part III.D. 
34. Letter from Att’y Gen. Eric H. Holder, to President Barack Obama (June 19, 
2012) [hereinafter Holder Letter], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/ag-ff-
exec-priv.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Although the formal document cited 
here is a letter from the Attorney General to the President, the fact that the letter appears 
on OLC’s website, in a collection of OLC opinions, reflects that OLC is very likely the 
source of the substance of the analysis.  
35. Id. at 2–4. 
36. Krass Memorandum, supra note 33, at 7. 
37. See Holder Letter, supra note 34, at 3 (noting “Presidents have repeatedly 
asserted executive privilege to protect confidential Executive Branch deliberative materials 
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uses of historical practice would require close attention to the different 
ways in which historical practice is used and the different reasons under-
lying those uses.38 Our point here is simply that, for one reason or 
another, reliance on historical practice is a common feature of OLC’s 
work.  
The executive branch’s attention to historical practice is also re-
flected in presidential issuance of “constitutional signing statements.” 
These statements, made when the President is signing a bill into law, call 
into question the constitutionality of one or more provisions in the bill 
and suggest that the President might not comply with the provisions, 
often on the ground that the provisions threaten to interfere with presi-
dential authority.39 As the executive branch has explained, “[p]articularly 
since omnibus bills have become prevalent, signing statements have 
often been used to ensure that concerns about the constitutionality of 
discrete statutory provisions do not require a veto of the entire bill.”40 
Although issued by both Democratic and Republican Presidents,41 these 
statements are controversial, with some critics claiming that the rule of 
law and separation of powers are offended when a President reserves the 
ability to disregard part of a bill that he signs into law.42 It does not 
                                                                                                                 
from congressional subpoena” and citing multiple precedents from several different 
administrations). 
38. For discussion of the importance of considering the specific reasons why 
historical practice is relied upon in general, as well as the distinction between reasons that 
depend on institutional acquiescence and those that do not, see generally Bradley & 
Morrison, supra note 1.  
39. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive 
Power, 23 Const. Comment. 307, 313–14 (2006). Signing statements are also used for 
other purposes, such as explaining to the public why the administration supported the law 
or directing officials within the executive branch about how the law should be interpreted 
or administered. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 
3, 1993), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/signing.htm (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
40. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and 
Agencies (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Memorandum-on-Presidential-Signing-Statements (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
41. See Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33667, Presidential Signing 
Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications 2–13 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(discussing presidential signing statements from Reagan Administration to Obama 
Administration). 
42. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the 
Separation of Powers Doctrine 5 (2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2006/annual/dailyjournal/20060823144113.authchec
kdam.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For debate over whether the President is 
constitutionally required to veto legislation containing provisions that he believes are 
unconstitutional, compare, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto 
Unconstitutional Bills, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 81, 81–82 (2007) (arguing there exists 
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appear, however, that Presidents commonly disregard the provisions to 
which they object in signing statements. This was true even during the 
George W. Bush Administration, which had a reputation for being par-
ticularly aggressive in its issuance of signing statements.43 Thus, instead of 
signaling an active intent to disregard the identified provision, signing 
statements may be better understood as attempts by the executive branch 
to prevent a claim that it has acquiesced in congressional intrusions on 
executive authority. In other words, these statements appear to be 
designed, at least in part, to prevent historical gloss from developing in a 
way that might limit presidential authority.44 
Legal scholarship relating to presidential power, especially in the 
area of foreign affairs, also frequently refers to historical practice. A 
number of scholars have referenced such practice, for example, in 
assessing whether and to what extent the President has the constitutional 
authority to initiate military operations in the absence of congressional 
authorization.45 Other scholars have emphasized practice in considering 
                                                                                                                 
constitutional duty to exercise veto in this situation), with William Baude, Signing 
Unconstitutional Laws, 86 Ind. L.J. 303, 309 (2011) (arguing there is no such 
constitutional duty). For an opinion by OLC expressing the view that “there are 
circumstances in which the President may appropriately decline to enforce a statute that 
he views as unconstitutional,” see Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the 
President (Nov. 2, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
43. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential Signing Statements 
Controversy, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 11, 13 (2007) (noting GAO report suggesting 
“general compliance by the Bush administration (like its predecessors) with even those 
elements of complex statutes the President had identified as constitutionally 
objectionable, rather than a bold flouting of Congress”); Nelson Lund, Presidential 
Signing Statements in Perspective, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 95, 107 (2007) (noting “the 
GAO’s inability to find that the Bush administration failed to comply with even a single 
statutory provision as a result of objections articulated in a presidential signing 
statement”). 
44. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 452–53; see also John Elwood, No 
Constitutional Signing Statement for the Guantanamo Transfer Restrictions, The Volokh 
Conspiracy (Jan. 9, 2011, 4:08 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/01/09/no-
constitutional-signing-statement-for-the-guantanamo-transfer-restrictions (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“[I]n my experience, most legislative provisions that are the subject 
of constitutional signing statements are implemented as written, and the signing statement 
is done mostly to ‘lay down a marker’ with Congress.”). 
45. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. Rev. (Special 
Issue) 19, 25–27, 29–31 (1970) (asserting historical practice has legitimized presidential 
war-making); Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1338, 1355–64 (1993) (reviewing John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: War Power and 
the Sirens of Formalism (1993)) (arguing it is “the ‘court of history,’ an accretion of 
interactions among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms governing the branches’ 
behavior in the area”); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers 
Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 Yale L.J. 845, 874–76 (1996) (reviewing Louis 
Fisher, Presidential War Power (1995)) (considering proper role of history in discerning 
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the circumstances under which the President may conclude international 
agreements without obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.46 
Even outside the foreign affairs area, academic debates about presiden-
tial authority—such as about the President’s power to remove executive 
officials from office47—are greatly influenced by considerations of histori-
cal practice. 
None of this is to suggest, of course, that reliance on historical 
practice in discerning presidential authority is free from difficulty. One 
obvious danger is that, if structural and other factors limit Congress’s 
ability to resist assertions of presidential authority, this approach to con-
stitutional interpretation might turn out to ratchet up presidential power 
over time. On the other hand, it may be that such a danger can be 
adequately checked by paying careful attention, when deciding what his-
torical practices should count, to the actual dynamics of congressional-
executive relations, including the conditions under which Congress can 
truly be said to have acquiesced in particular presidential actions.48 The 
key point for present purposes is simply that reliance on historical 
practice is a standard part of modern constitutional argumentation and 
decisionmaking. 
B. Limitations on Judicial Review 
If courts routinely reviewed contested issues of presidential power, 
they could decide whether and when to credit historical practice in this 
area. They could also decide whether novel presidential assertions of 
authority were justified, before such assertions became established 
practice. But judicial review in this area is anything but routine. Courts 
obviously do review issues of presidential power in some instances, 
especially when individual rights are perceived to be at stake, as both 
Youngstown and the series of Supreme Court decisions concerning the 
“war on terror” illustrate.49 When individual rights are not directly impli-
                                                                                                                 
allocation of war powers). 
46. E.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. 
Rev. 799 (1995); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of 
International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236 (2008); Peter J. Spiro, 
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 961 (2001) 
[hereinafter Spiro, Treaties]; John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of 
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 757 (2001). 
47. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive (2008); 
Harold J. Krent, The Sometimes Unitary Executive: Presidential Practice Throughout 
History, 25 Const. Comment. 489 (2009) (reviewing Calabresi & Yoo, supra). 
48. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 444–47, 448–52 (arguing for such focus 
on dynamics of congressional-executive relations). 
49. For the relevant war on terror decisions, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
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cated, however, courts often abstain from addressing questions 
surrounding the allocation of authority between Congress and the 
President. 
Judicial abstention is particularly common in the foreign affairs area. 
Consider, for example, the question of whether the President is constitu-
tionally required to obtain congressional authorization before initiating 
military hostilities. Despite numerous presidential initiations of hostilities 
without congressional authorization in the post-World War II period, 
courts have generally refused to consider the issue.50 Courts have 
similarly avoided addressing whether Presidents must obtain congres-
sional or senatorial approval before terminating a treaty,51 and whether 
and to what extent Presidents may use executive agreements in lieu of 
treaties.52 
Courts invoke a variety of doctrines in support of this abstention. 
They enforce general standing requirements strictly, and, at least since 
the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd,53 they typically find 
that individual members of Congress lack standing to challenge presi-
dential action.54 Some lower courts also invoke ideas of “political ripe-
ness,” pursuant to which they will not intervene in interbranch disputes 
until the affected branch has exhausted its own political resources to 
address the purported problem, a requirement that is rarely if ever satis-
fied.55 Another potential barrier to judicial review is the political question 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), superseded by statute, Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
50. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that 
members of Congress lacked standing to challenge President Clinton’s use of military 
force in Yugoslavia); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding 
that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s use of military 
force in Libya). 
51. See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing 
complaint by members of Congress against President Bush for withdrawing United States 
from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). The D.C. Circuit addressed the merits of a treaty 
termination in Goldwater v. Carter, but the Supreme Court vacated the decision on 
justiciability grounds. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
52. See, e.g., Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1319 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (dismissing challenge to constitutionality of North American Free Trade 
Agreement). 
53. 521 U.S. 811 (1997). In Raines, the Court indicated that members of Congress will 
ordinarily lack standing to complain that an action has caused them institutional injury 
unless they can show that their votes have been “completely nullified” by the action. Id. at 
823–24. 
54. See, e.g., Campbell, 203 F.3d at 19. 
55. See, e.g., Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 137 (1st Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal of 
suit seeking to prevent President Bush from initiating military operations in Iraq); see also 
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding 
challenge to presidential termination of treaty was “not ripe for judicial review” because 
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doctrine, which the lower courts apply with some frequency in the 
foreign affairs area.56 
Academic defenders of this judicial abstention have argued either 
that the political branches have adequate resources to protect their 
interests,57 or that the courts lack sufficient competence to resolve 
separation of powers issues, especially in the foreign affairs and national 
security areas.58 Other scholars have bemoaned this abstention as an 
abdication of the judicial role and have blamed it for contributing to 
what they perceive to be an undesirable growth in executive power in the 
modern era.59 The bottom line is that many issues of presidential power 
are resolved, if at all, outside the courts. Moreover, even when the courts 
do intervene, they are likely to give significant deference to patterns of 
governmental practice, especially if the patterns are longstanding and 
appear to reflect interbranch agreement.60 
                                                                                                                 
Congress had not attempted to use its resources to oppose President’s treaty termination, 
and thus there was no “constitutional impasse” between branches). 
56. See, e.g., Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (plurality opinion) (Rehnquist, J.); Made in 
the USA Found., 242 F.3d at 1319. 
57. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 275 
(1980) (arguing judicial review of boundaries of executive and legislative power is 
unnecessary because “[e]ach branch . . . has tremendous incentives . . . to guard its 
constitutional boundaries and assigned prerogatives” and “[i]f either branch perceives a 
constitutional violation of this kind, . . . [it] possesses an impressive arsenal of weapons to 
demand observance of constitutional dictates”); see also Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004 
(plurality opinion) (emphasizing, in considering whether President had unilateral power 
to terminate treaty, that case involved “a dispute between coequal branches of our 
Government, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests”). 
58. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, 
Liberty, and the Courts 12 (2007) (arguing courts “should defer to government action” 
during national security emergencies); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 
Iowa L. Rev. 941, 944 (2004) (arguing considerations of institutional competence support 
judicial abstention in foreign affairs area). 
59. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 45, at 66–67 (1993) (“The judiciary shouldn’t decide 
what wars we fight, but it can insure that Congress play its constitutionally mandated role 
in such decisions. It has become imperative that one way or another it do so.”); Thomas 
M. Franck, Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign 
Affairs? 7 (1992) (urging “U.S. federal courts [to] stop abdicating in foreign-affairs cases”); 
Harold Hongju Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-
Contra Affair ch. 6 (1990) (criticizing phenomenon of judicial deference in foreign 
affairs). 
60. See supra text accompanying notes 23–31 (discussing cases showing significant 
judicial deference to longstanding practices of presidential and congressional power). An 
important exception is INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), in which the Court held 
unconstitutional a “legislative veto” provision even though Congress had enacted many 
similar provisions since the 1930s. While emphasizing that “the fact that a given law or 
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, 
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution,” the Court also noted 
that “11 Presidents, from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with 
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C. Skepticism About Legal Constraint 
The general posture of judicial abstention in this area raises 
questions about whether presidential power is truly subject to legal 
constraints. It is often easier—or at least more familiar—to talk meaning-
fully about law if there is a reasonable prospect that the actions in 
question will face judicial review. Because the courts are unlikely to 
intervene in many controversies relating to presidential power—and 
because any such intervention is likely to be deferential to the actions of 
the political branches—some scholars are inclined to say that Presidents 
face (or will soon face) virtually no constraints at all. Part of the concern 
here is that Congress by itself often seems either unable or unwilling to 
provide adequate checks on executive power. Compounding the 
problem, in the view of some scholars, is that institutional arrangements 
within the executive branch are not able to constrain presidential 
decisionmaking. Bruce Ackerman, for example, claims to identify a range 
of developments in “politics and communications, bureaucratic and 
military organization,” as well as “executive constitutionalism,” that 
threaten to turn the presidency into “a vehicle for demagogic populism 
and lawlessness.”61 
Other scholars contend that Presidents face some constraints on 
their actions, but depict those constraints in extralegal terms. Eric Posner 
and Adrian Vermeule, for example, argue that “law does little to 
constrain the modern executive,” and that whatever constraints 
Presidents do face are instead a matter of “politics and public opinion.”62 
On this view, any seemingly stable arrangements affecting presidential 
power are simply “non-normative equilibria”63 or focal points of 
coordination with no authoritative status.64 If so, the existence of a 
particular arrangement might in some instances constrain presidential 
action, but it provides no strong normative justification for its continued 
existence if political or other extralegal factors pull in a different 
direction.  
Some of this skepticism, especially when coming from the political 
left, is related to a more general concern about the growth of presi-
dential power in the modern era, a concern reflected in the historian 
                                                                                                                 
this issue have gone on record at some point to challenge congressional vetoes as 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 942 n.13, 944. 
61. Ackerman, Decline, supra note 5, at 4.  
62. Posner & Vermeule, The Executive Unbound, supra note 5, at 15.  
63. Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 993.  
64. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, 
Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1836 (2009) (“We might also 
understand the settlement of non-textual constitutional issues as instances of successful 
coordination.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 991, 1002 (2008) (“Precedents may just be patterns of behavior that parties 
recognize as providing focal points that permit cooperation or coordination.”). 
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Arthur Schlesinger’s account of the “imperial presidency.”65 That 
concern was especially prominent during the George W. Bush 
Administration, which was thought by some to have used the post-
September 11 security environment as an opportunity to make particu-
larly broad claims of presidential power.66 But concerns about presiden-
tial unilateralism have continued into the Obama Administration.67 The 
skepticism may also trace to post-Watergate cynicism about the behavior 
of government officials, including the extent to which they are likely to 
act based on internalized norms.68  
Skepticism about the extent to which the presidency is constrained 
by law implicates a series of questions relevant to this Essay. Most 
generally, what is the relationship between law and politics in this area? 
Can historical practice-based understandings of presidential power carry 
legal status even if they are enforced by political means? What is the 
significance, if any, of the fact that historical practice relating to presi-
dential power is often invoked by government actors in legal terms? To 
begin answering these and related questions, the next Part considers 
more specifically what it means to say that the President is constrained by 
law. 
Of course, presidential power is not the only area in which there are 
questions about the existence and extent of legal constraint. Somewhat 
analogous issues are raised, for example, about the effect of international 
law on the behavior of nation-states, in light of the general absence in the 
                                                                                                                 
65. See generally Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (First Mariner 
Books 2004) (1973). 
66. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and 
the Subversion of American Democracy 9 (2007) (“The war on terrorism’s climate of 
perpetual emergency provided a vehicle for turning [Vice-President Cheney’s] vision of an 
unfettered commander in chief into a reality.”); Schlesinger, supra note 65, at xvii (“Once 
again, international crisis has resurrected the Imperial Presidency.”); Frederick A.O. 
Schwarz Jr. & Aziz Z. Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of 
Terror 200 (2007) (“With an arrogance born of historical amnesia, the Bush 
Administration invoked 9/11 to claim a power unprecedented on this side of the North 
Atlantic to suspend or wholly circumvent laws passed by Congress barring torture, 
detention without judicial review, and wiretapping without warrants.”). 
67. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 23, 2012, at A1 (“[T]he Administration has been seeking ways to act without 
Congress.”); Andrew Romano & Daniel Klaidman, President Obama’s Executive Power 
Grab, Newsweek, Oct. 22, 2012, http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/10/21/
president-obama-s-executive-power-grab.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(suggesting President Obama had shifted to unilateral action in face of congressional 
obstruction). 
68. See, e.g., John P. MacKenzie, The Appearance of Justice 225–26 (1974) (linking 
increased public cynicism about national leaders to Watergate); James T. Patterson, Grand 
Expectations 782 (1996) (noting broad public perception that “Watergate . . . proved . . . 
the deviousness and arrogance of government officials who claimed to serve the public 
interest”). 
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international arena of both authoritative judicial review and formal 
enforcement mechanisms.69 Nevertheless, as we discuss in Part III, at least 
some of the potential legal constraints on presidential power reflect 
specific characteristics of U.S. legal culture and executive branch 
structure, and might not translate to other contexts. Therefore, while 
some of this Essay’s conceptual analysis may be applicable to questions 
about the constraining effect of law more generally, our focus here is 
solely on presidential power. 
II. UNPACKING THE IDEA OF LEGAL CONSTRAINT 
To assess whether and how law, including practice-based law, might 
constrain the President, we first need to understand what it means for 
law to constrain. In this Part, therefore, we attempt to unpack the idea of 
legal constraint. We start by distinguishing noncompliance with law from 
reasonable disagreements about law. Next, we address the difficulty of 
“observational equivalence,” whereby actions consistent with law may be 
taken for nonlegal reasons, and whereby actions inconsistent with law 
may occur even though law acted as a constraint. Finally, we explore 
several relationships that affect law’s capacity to constrain: between law’s 
role in constraining government action and its role in constituting (and 
thus enabling) government, between law and enforcement, and between 
law and judicial review.  
A. Assessing Noncompliance  
Before considering what it means to say that the President is con-
strained by law, it is important to note that it can be difficult to assess 
whether particular presidential actions should count as legal compliance 
or noncompliance. As an initial matter, we need some way to distinguish 
noncompliance from genuine disagreement about what the law requires. 
It is rare for Presidents to acknowledge that they are acting inconsistently 
with the law. Instead, they typically argue that the law does not require 
what critics are contending. In the war powers area, for example, 
Presidents have long claimed that the Constitution grants them the 
authority to use military force unilaterally, at least in certain 
circumstances. The Obama Administration made that very claim 
regarding the military operations in Libya in 2011.70 As that episode also 
illustrates, presidential uses of force without congressional authorization 
are never presented as exceeding legal boundaries, and critics’ cries of 
                                                                                                                 
69. Compare, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International 
Law 13 (2005) (arguing international law “is not a check on state self-interest”), with Oona 
A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 
72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469 (2005) (emphasizing importance of informal enforcement 
measures to operation of international law). 
70. See Krass Memorandum, supra note 33. 
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illegality are virtually always contested. Obviously, the greater the 
indeterminacy of the law in question, the more likely it is that there will 
be disputes over what the law provides. If the dispute is genuine and 
reasonable, we do not think it makes sense to call the presidential action 
at issue noncompliant with the law.  
On issues of presidential power, the role of historical practice can 
make it especially difficult to disentangle noncompliance with the law 
from disagreement about the law. The challenges lie on two levels. First, 
although historical practice is regularly invoked by courts and other 
interpreters addressing issues of presidential power, some critics of pres-
idential action might maintain that historical practice should not play 
such a role. Originalist constitutional law scholars might insist, for 
example, that the constitutional law of presidential power should be 
based exclusively on the Founding generation’s understanding of the 
constitutional text.71 Other scholars might object that, even if constitu-
tional meaning is not fixed at the Founding, the historical gloss method 
of constitutional interpretation is objectionable because it unduly favors 
executive authority. These perspectives may lead to charges that 
particular exercises of presidential power are unlawful even if supported 
by what otherwise might be considered to be practice-based constitu-
tional law. Of course, methodological disputes are common in constitu-
tional law, so the problem is not unique to this topic. In any event, as 
summarized in Part I and as detailed in our other work, historical 
practice does in fact occupy a central role in debates about the constitu-
tional law of presidential power.72 For purposes of this Essay, we assume 
that it will continue to do so. 
The second level is substantive: To the extent that constitutional 
limits on presidential authority are informed by historical practice, on 
any given issue one first needs to have a view about the relevant practice 
before assessing whether the President has complied with the law. Thus, 
for example, if one concludes that the best description of practice-
informed presidential power is that the President may use military force 
unilaterally for small-scale operations with discrete objectives but not for 
conflicts that are expected to require a substantial and protracted 
commitment of ground troops, one might find general presidential 
                                                                                                                 
71. This is just one illustration of a larger point that disputes over the legality of a 
given presidential action can involve not just disagreement about what a given set of legal 
authorities provides, but also disagreement about what counts as a legitimate source of law 
or legal meaning. Situations that might at first seem like legal noncompliance might be 
better seen as involving disagreements of this sort—for example, a disagreement over the 
extent to which moral or pragmatic considerations are part of the law. For a discussion of 
the analytical difficulties that can arise when law is viewed as encompassing a broad range 
of such considerations, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed 17 n.40 (Sept. 20, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
72. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 417–24. 
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compliance with the law in this area.73 But if one has a different view of 
the practice-based constitutional law relevant to this issue, one may be 
more inclined to see certain presidential uses of military force as 
unlawful.74 As with methodological disagreement, this sort of dispute 
about the relevant content of the law is not uncommon in other areas of 
law. For purposes of this Essay, we do not take a position on the content 
of practice-based constitutional law on specific issues. Instead, we simply 
assume that it is at least sometimes possible to distinguish between 
legitimate disagreement about the law and noncompliance with the law, 
even on issues of presidential power for which the law is heavily 
influenced by historical practice.  
An additional complication arises when there are multiple sources of 
law that potentially relate to the same presidential action. In that 
situation, even if there is no dispute about the content of the underlying 
law, Presidents may claim that the otherwise governing law has been 
displaced by some other law. A statutory prohibition at Time 1, for 
example, might arguably be displaced by a congressional authorization at 
Time 2. Or a statutory restriction might arguably be unconstitutional, 
perhaps because it invades some exclusive presidential prerogative. 
Again, if presidential action is supported by a reasonable claim along 
these lines, we do not think it makes sense to label it noncompliance.75 
Of course, not all such claims will be reasonable, so the mere existence of 
a claim will not resolve whether the action complies with law.  
We recognize that the above references to the “reasonableness” (or 
to “plausibility,” “debatability,” and so on) of various arguments 
introduce added complications. Legal compliance can mean different 
things in different contexts. In some circumstances, complying with the 
law could mean adhering to a view that is ultimately deemed to be the 
correct one. That orientation is common in circumstances subject to 
final resolution by a single authoritative decisionmaker, like a court.76 
But especially in areas not frequently subject to judicial review and more 
heavily influenced by historical practice—that is, areas like the one we 
focus on in this Essay—the orientation might more commonly focus on 
                                                                                                                 
73. See id. at 462–63.  
74. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 33, at 18–19 (disputing OLC’s argument that past 
practice supported legality of President Obama’s use of military force in Libya).  
75. For the view that the President has the authority not to enforce laws that he deems 
unconstitutional, see generally Presidential Auth. to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional 
Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C. 199 (1994). For the view that he has a duty not to enforce such 
laws, see generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard 
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2008). 
76. It is not always how courts proceed, however. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (requiring judicial deference 
under certain circumstances to reasonable interpretations of statutes by administrative 
agencies charged with implementing them). 
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legal reasonableness or plausibility. We do not attempt here to determine 
precisely what these weaker forms of legal persuasiveness might entail, or 
how they might differ among themselves. The key point is simply that 
they involve a lower degree of legal certainty and thereby allow for a 
broader range of discretion.  
To be sure, some executive branch actors involved in assessing the 
law of presidential power might themselves claim to focus on some 
version of legal correctness. As noted above and discussed in greater 
detail below, OLC is an example.77 But OLC is not a typical executive 
legal office, and only a small fraction of all the legal questions arising 
within the executive branch go to OLC. Moreover, whatever the orienta-
tion of the executive actor in question, relevant audiences (whether in 
Congress, the press, or the informed public more generally) might be 
more attuned to whether the President operates within the bounds of 
legal reasonableness or plausibility than to whether he adheres to a 
single “correct” view of the law. If nothing else, it seems likely that the 
negative consequences to a President of appearing to exceed the 
boundaries of what is plausible would be more severe than the negative 
consequences of asserting a plausible but not ultimately persuasive view 
of the law.  
In situations where legal plausibility or some similar standard is the 
touchstone, determining noncompliance can be especially difficult. If 
the correct view of the practice-based law of presidential power is often 
hard to discern, determining what views are reasonable on such matters 
can be even more challenging. Such judgments will often (indeed, 
perhaps always) be debatable. But that difficulty is not unique to this 
topic; it is a feature of legal argumentation generally. In any event, the 
fact that the legality of a particular presidential action may be debatable 
does not mean that law cannot operate as a constraint in that context.78 
Even if the President is advised that there is a minimally plausible argu-
ment in favor of the action in question, the law might still constrain him 
not to act if the argument is perceived as being too weak. The relative per-
ceived strength of a legal argument, in other words, might have a 
constraining effect.79 
                                                                                                                 
77. See supra text accompanying note 32; infra text accompanying notes 127–130. 
78. See Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 1006 (“From reasonable 
and conscientious disagreement, one cannot infer the absence of normative constraint.”). 
79. Whether this scenario involves “law” acting as a constraint will depend to some 
extent on one’s definition of law. Under a Dworkinian conception of law, pursuant to 
which there is a single best reading of the legal materials, a mere plausibility constraint 
might not be a legal one. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 231 (1986) (suggesting 
there will be best legal interpretation in terms of fit with prior legal materials and 
principles). Even under that conception, however, one could reasonably describe the 
plausibility constraint as “law-related.” 
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Consider, for example, the confrontation that developed in the 
summer of 2011 between the Obama Administration and Republican 
leaders in Congress over whether to increase the statutory debt ceiling. 
When a legislative extension appeared unlikely, some commentators 
suggested, based on either novel constitutional arguments or pure policy 
grounds, that the President could and should unilaterally exceed the 
debt ceiling.80 Others insisted that such unilateral action would be 
unconstitutional because it would usurp Congress’s constitutional 
authority “[t]o borrow [m]oney on the credit of the United States.”81 
Historical practice was potentially relevant to the issue in that, as noted 
by Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, “[t]hroughout American history, the 
debt ceiling always has been set and raised by statute, not executive 
decision-making.”82 President Obama did not attempt to address the 
issue unilaterally and instead continued to seek a legislative extension of 
the ceiling, which he ultimately obtained. In explaining his decision, 
Obama stated publicly that he had consulted with his lawyers about the 
argument that he had the authority to extend the debt ceiling unilater-
ally, and noted that “[t]hey’re not persuaded that that is a winning 
argument.”83  
                                                                                                                 
80. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Can Obama Extend the Debt Ceiling on His Own?, 
N.Y. Rev. Books (July 29, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011
/jul/29/can-obama-extend-debt-ceiling-his-own/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(arguing President had authority based on provision in Fourteenth Amendment stating 
that “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States . . . shall not be questioned,” 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Op-Ed., Obama Should 
Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. Times, July 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing 
President had authority to raise debt ceiling based on “the necessities of state” and his 
“role as the ultimate guardian of the constitutional order”);  see also Neil H. Buchanan & 
Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the 
President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1205–14 
(2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose] (arguing President has 
constitutional duty to execute spending laws enacted by Congress, to collect tax revenues 
pursuant to laws enacted by Congress, and to keep borrowing within limits specified in 
debt ceiling statute, and contending that, when those duties come into conflict, least 
unconstitutional (and hence most preferable) course of action is for President to honor 
Congress’s wishes regarding spending and taxes by setting aside debt ceiling). 
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., A Ceiling We 
Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2011, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20
11/07/08/opinion/08tribe.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
82. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution, Obama and Raising the Debt Ceiling, L.A. 
Times Opinion L.A. (July 29, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla
/2011/07/erwin-chemerinsky-on-why-obama-cant-raise-the-debt-ceiling.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). 
83. David Jackson, Obama Says He Can’t Raise Debt Ceiling on His Own, USA Today 
The Oval (July 22, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval
/post/2011/07/obama-speaks-at-university-of-maryland/1#.UQBAoI6pVE8 (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review). Some accounts from former insiders accord with this account. 
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 When the debt ceiling issues returned in late 2012 and early 2013, a 
similar scenario unfolded. Some commentators and Democrats in 
Congress suggested a variety of legal arguments that Obama could invoke 
in support of unilateral action.84 But the President appeared once again 
to wave off these arguments, and executive branch officials cited legal 
considerations in support of that decision.85  
                                                                                                                 
See, e.g., David Jarmul, Kind Words for Colleagues in Washington, Duke Today (July 14, 
2012), http://today.duke.edu/2012/07/powelldc (quoting H. Jefferson Powell, after he 
had served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General, as saying “the administration did not 
embrace any of these magic fixes (I mean the sarcasm) and you might well assume that at 
least part of the reason is that the administration’s lawyers told the policymakers that the 
op-eds were not responsible legal arguments”).  
84. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling 
Threat Once and For All: Why the President Should Embrace the Least Unconstitutional 
Option, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 237, 238 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org
/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/237_Buchanan_Dorf.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (reiterating “least unconstitutional option” argument advanced in Buchanan & 
Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 80, in context of late-2012 standoff); Carlos Mucha, Op-
Ed., The Coin, N.Y. Times Room for Debate (Jan. 13, 2012, 7:22 PM), http://www
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/13/proposing-the-unprecedented-to-avoid-default
/platinum-coin-would-create-a-trillion-dollar-in-funds (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (arguing Treasury Secretary should direct United States Mint to produce “a 
platinum numismastic [sic] coin with, say, a $1 trillion denomination,” which “can then be 
deposited at the Federal Reserve, and the Fed will credit the account of the U.S. 
government for the face value of the coin”); Eric Posner, The President Has the Power to 
Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, Slate, Jan. 4, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles
/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/01/debt_ceiling_president_obama_has_th
e_power_to_raise_the_debt_limit_without.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(arguing “[w]here Congress fails to provide him with consistent instructions, [the 
President] has the discretion to do what he believes is in the public interest,” including 
undertaking “some combination of cutting spending, borrowing beyond the debt limit, 
and perhaps even searching out new sources of revenue”); see also Jonathan Weisman, 
“Any Lawful Steps” Urged To Avert Default, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2013, at A11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/us/politics/democrats-urge-obama-to-take-any-law
ful-steps-to-avoid-default.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting letter from 
Senate Democratic leadership to President Obama, saying if Congress fails to raise debt 
ceiling, “we believe you must be willing to take any lawful steps to ensure that America 
does not break its promises and trigger a global economic crisis—without Congressional 
approval, if necessary”).  
85. See, e.g., Ian Katz, Treasury, Fed Oppose Using Platinum Coin to Avoid Debt 
Ceiling, Bloomberg Businessweek, Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2013-01-12/treasury-fed-oppose-using-platinum-coin-to-avoid-debt-limit (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (quoting Treasury Department spokesman as saying “[n]either the 
Treasury Department nor the Federal Reserve believes that the law can or should be used 
to facilitate the production of platinum coins for the purpose of avoiding an increase in 
the debt limit”); Press Release, Press Sec’y Jay Carney, White House Press Briefing (Dec. 6, 
2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/06/press-briefing-press-sec
retary-jay-carney-12062012 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]his administration 
does not believe that the 14th Amendment gives the President the power to ignore the 
debt ceiling—period.”).  
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In light of the novelty of the issue, the conclusion of executive 
branch lawyers that there was no “winning argument” might not have 
reflected a belief that a unilateral extension of the debt ceiling was dis-
allowed by a single correct view of the law. Instead, it is possible that they 
acknowledged some uncertainty in this area but were still skeptical about 
the unilateral authority arguments. That skepticism might have entailed 
a conclusion that the arguments exceeded the boundaries of even mere 
plausibility, or it might have entailed a judgment that the arguments, 
though minimally plausible to some executive lawyers, risked exposing 
the President to political sanctions from congressional or other 
opponents who might reasonably characterize the state of the law 
differently and claim that he had acted illegally. Either way, if the 
perceived weakness of the arguments contributed to the President’s 
decision not to attempt a unilateral extension, the law would have had a 
constraining effect even though its precise contours were uncertain.86  
To be sure, an administration determined to pursue a particular 
agenda aggressively might treat bare plausibility as the only legal 
constraint and also push the limits of plausibility beyond where others 
would go. Some observers might see certain actions of the George W. 
Bush Administration in the war on terror as examples of such an 
approach.87 As a general matter, however, if in areas of legal uncertainty 
the relative weakness of a legal argument makes it less likely that the 
President will pursue the action in question, then uncertainty about the 
correct view of the law would not, by itself, prevent the law from 
operating as a constraint.88 
                                                                                                                 
86. The trillion-dollar platinum coin proposal, see Mucha, supra note 84, highlights 
another complication relating to the constraining effect of law. It is possible that the 
executive branch thought that the proposal was legally defensible but that it would not be 
perceived that way by the public. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Priorities, N.Y. Times Room 
for Debate (Jan. 13, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/
13/proposing-the-unprecedented-to-avoid-default/priortizing-debt-obligations-is-the-most-
constitutional-plan (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing platinum coin idea 
as “technically legal but wildly unrealistic”). If so, the “law” that constrains might in some 
instances not be the law as understood by legal experts. 
87. See, e.g., Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, Wash. Post, 
Dec. 30, 2005, at A1 (noting “the administration asked government lawyers to draw up new 
rules and reinterpret old ones to approve” banned or discouraged activities and quoting 
General Michael V. Hayden, then-Deputy Director of National Intelligence, as saying “[a]s 
a professional, I’m troubled if I’m not using the full authority allowed by law”). Of course, 
others will take the view that even under a standard of minimal plausibility, some of the 
Bush Administration’s actions—like finding “waterboarding” not to violate the federal 
anti-torture statute—went too far. That is in fact our view, but it is not central to the point 
made in this Essay. 
88. Separate from the uncertainties linked to the content of the law, a further 
challenge to assessing noncompliance in this area is the possibility that, in some extreme 
circumstances, Presidents might claim a prerogative to violate the law in pursuit of some 
other overriding imperative. As Thomas Jefferson put it, “A strict observance of the written 
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Finally, it is important to acknowledge the risk of tautology when 
considering compliance with practice-based legal constraints. The more 
the law is defined by actual governmental practice, the more the 
behavior of government institutions will become definitionally 
“compliant” with the law. The tautology here is analogous to President 
Nixon’s infamous claim that “when the President does it, that means that 
it is not illegal.”89 Significantly, however, this problem is not inevitable for 
a practice-based approach to law. Many accounts of how historical 
practice should inform the law of presidential power emphasize factors 
like consistency over time and acquiescence by Congress—factors that 
will not be present in all situations.90 As we have explained elsewhere, it 
may also make sense in some contexts to impose requirements beyond 
those reflected in current doctrine, such as bipartisan acceptance or 
express congressional endorsement.91 In short, to say that historical 
practice informs the law of presidential power is not to say that all 
arguments based on purported practice necessarily prevail. 
B. Defining Constraint 
The mere fact that the President acts in accordance with law in 
particular cases is not enough to show that law constrains the executive. 
After all, the President might have taken the same action even if there 
were no legal rule on point—for example, out of political self-interest or 
                                                                                                                 
laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of 
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher 
obligation.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 12 The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1904). The idea is commonly 
traced to John Locke. See John Locke, Second Treatise on Government § 160 (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., 1980) (discussing “power to act according to discretion, for the public 
good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it”). Yet this idea of 
a “prerogative power” (which, in practice, is virtually never invoked) seems importantly 
distinct from ordinary noncompliance with the law. As traditionally conceived, assertions 
of the prerogative power entail openly acknowledging the unlawfulness of the action in 
question and subjecting oneself to the ex post judgment of Congress and the people. See 
David Gray Adler, The Framers and Executive Prerogative: A Constitutional and Historical 
Rebuke, 42 Presidential Stud. Q. 376, 387 (2012) (explaining Jefferson “emphasize[d] that 
an official who assumes the power to act illegally must seek exoneration from Congress”). 
Given those and other unique properties of the prerogative power, an account of 
noncompliance with the law probably should not include reasonable invocations of that 
power.  
89. Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina War, 
N.Y. Times, May 20, 1977, at A16.  
90. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 432 & n.86 (noting various accounts of 
institutional acquiescence); see also Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the 
Discipline of History, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 377, 410–16 (2011) (book review) (emphasizing 
need for care in identifying circumstances under which historical practice should be 
credited). 
91. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 454–55. 
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some sort of tacit coordination. If so, the alignment between presidential 
action and law would simply be an instance of observational 
equivalence.92 Conversely, violations of the law do not necessarily show 
that law has no influence—it may just be that, in certain cases, the legal 
constraint was outweighed by other considerations. So merely observing 
presidential behavior and comparing that behavior to purported legal 
rules is insufficient. 
Instead, our contention is that law should be understood to operate 
as a constraint on the President when it exerts some force on decisionmaking 
because of its status as law. This definition does not require that law will 
always be the deciding factor in motivating presidential behavior, but it 
does require that law have the potential to be the deciding factor. By 
contrast, if the legal status of a rule can never be the deciding factor in 
motivating presidential action—if, for example, the rule is always subor-
dinated to policy or political considerations when it conflicts with them—
then the rule does not operate as a constraint.  
This test admittedly imposes a low burden. Law would count as a 
constraint under this test even if it affected decisionmaking only in 
situations in which nonlegal considerations were nearly balanced in favor 
of and against the proposed action. If the law had an effect only in those 
circumstances, it would obviously be a weak constraint at best.93 For 
analytical purposes, however, we think it is important to distinguish be-
tween two issues: first, whether the presidency is constrained at all by law 
(and, in particular, practice-based constitutional law), and, second, the 
extent of such constraint. The principal focus of this Essay is on the first 
question. We recognize that even if this first question is answered 
affirmatively, the importance of law as a constraint will ultimately turn on 
the answer to the second question. A complete answer to the second 
question would require systematic empirical analysis that this Essay does 
not attempt, although the Conclusion does suggest some potential 
avenues for such analysis and research. 
As discussed in Part III, the constraining effect of law could stem 
from either internal or external considerations. Obviously, if an actor has 
internalized the normative force of a legal rule, the rule is having an 
effect. This is what is sometimes referred to as the “Hartian” perspective, 
after the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart.94 But even if an actor has not 
internalized the rule, there is legal effect, we would contend, if sanctions 
                                                                                                                 
92. See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1402 
(2012) [hereinafter Pildes, Law and the President] (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, The 
Executive Unbound, supra note 5). 
93. See Frederick Schauer, The Political Risks (if Any) of Breaking the Law, 4 J. Legal 
Analysis 83, 88 (2012) [hereinafter Schauer, Political Risks]. 
94. See Pildes, Law and the President, supra note 92, at 1404 n.69 (describing 
Hartian perspective as “the classic account of law as a practice that is experienced as 
normatively binding” (citing H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed. 1994))). 
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for noncompliance are affected by the norm’s legal status.95 Thus, law 
can act as a constraint even if not internalized by the actor. That is, law 
can constrain even what Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to as a “bad 
man,” as long as the existence or strength of the relevant sanctions is tied 
at least in part to the fact that the norm in question is a legal norm.96  
In many situations it will be possible to identify multiple reasons why 
the President took a given action. The existence of such mixed motives 
should not be enough, we would contend, to defeat the existence of a 
legal effect. It might often be the case, for example, that an action will be 
taken for both legal and political reasons. The question is whether the 
legal reasons are exercising any additional force beyond the political, not 
whether the legal reasons are the only reasons for the action. Nor should 
it defeat the existence of a legal effect if the sanctions themselves are 
political in nature. As discussed further below, the type of the sanctions 
should not matter. Instead, the issue should be whether the presence or 
severity of a given sanction is affected by the fact that the norm in 
question is understood (by those imposing the sanction) at least in part 
as a legal norm.  
If a given sanction operates entirely on the basis of nonlegal consid-
erations, however, we would not count it as showing a legal effect. Most 
informal sanctions are in a sense constituted by law—for example, 
members of Congress, the media, and private individuals have speech 
rights under the Constitution that allow them to criticize government 
action, and individuals who meet certain legal requirements have the 
right to vote against officials whose actions they dislike—but we do not 
think it is useful to describe sanctions as legal constraints merely because 
they are constituted by law in this fashion. By collapsing the traditional 
distinction between law and politics, such an approach would render the 
question whether the President is constrained by law uninteresting, since 
no one contends that the President is unconstrained by politics. Instead, 
we would suggest that it is more fruitful to ask whether the sanction at 
issue is not simply made possible by law in the constitutive sense, but also 
responsive, at least in part, to the legal status of the underlying norm it is 
enforcing.  
                                                                                                                 
95. But see Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 981 (describing 
perspective under which “it is only as refracted through individual minds and consciences 
that legal norms can be motivationally efficacious”). 
96. See Pildes, Law and the President, supra note 92, at 1392–93 (“[T]he premise . . . 
is that public officials obey the law not for normative reasons but only when the benefits of 
legal compliance in specific contexts outweigh the costs.”); see also Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want to know the 
law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material 
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds 
. . . reasons for conduct . . . in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”). 
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None of this is to suggest, of course, that law and politics are com-
pletely separate, and in fact one of the central themes of this Essay is that 
the two are frequently intertwined. Among other things, law and politics 
often act in tandem either in support of, or in opposition to, presidential 
action. The point here is simply that it is important to think beyond the 
purely political aspect of sanctions. 
C. Enabling and Constraining 
Another framing question relates to the fact that law can play dual 
roles. Law not only constrains government but also constitutes and 
enables it. For example, a person can claim presidential authority in the 
United States in part by showing that he or she has complied with certain 
legal requirements for assuming the presidency. In that fundamental 
sense, law enables presidential action by legitimizing assertions of 
authority by those who satisfy its requirements. Inherently, these 
enabling rules also act as constraints: Individuals cannot claim 
presidential authority without complying with them. Constraints of this 
sort are often taken for granted, perhaps because they are so clearly tied 
to specific constitutional text and uniform historical practice that no one 
seriously contemplates flouting them. Individuals under the age of thirty-
five do not attempt to run for President, and Presidents (since the 
Twenty-Second Amendment) do not attempt to serve more than two 
terms in office. In short, law inherently both empowers and constrains 
presidential action.97 For that reason it is likely impossible to determine 
whether the President is more constrained or enabled by the law in a 
general sense, because the President depends on the law for his very 
existence within our constitutional system.98 There is thus no realistic 
counterfactual against which to make the comparison.  
Relatedly, it may not be possible to say with confidence whether par-
ticular law-focused entities within the executive branch have a 
constraining or enabling effect on the President overall. Consider OLC, 
for example. OLC’s reputation for reasonably independent, detached 
                                                                                                                 
97. See Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 979 (“To be a president or 
a member of Congress or a justice of the Supreme Court is to serve in an institution that is 
constituted and empowered by the Constitution and, as a result, necessarily constrained by 
it.”); Levinson, Parchment, supra note 14, at 711 (“[L]egal regimes are capable of 
constraining powerful political actors because they are also, and even more so, enabling for 
these actors.”). 
98. See, e.g., Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 979 (“As both a 
conceptual and a practical matter, the alternative to constrained presidents, congressmen, 
and justices is not unconstrained officials, but rather no presidents, congressmen, or 
justices at all.”); Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 64, at 1838 (“There is no sense in 
assessing the effect of constitutional law by contrast to what the President would do ‘in the 
absence of constitutional law,’ since neither the President nor his capability to do anything 
would exist at all without constitutional law.”). 
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legal analysis gives its work special weight. But there is no constitutional 
requirement that OLC even exist, and the President could in theory 
choose not to seek OLC’s legal advice on any given question.99 Thus, the 
fact that OLC does exist—and that Presidents regularly seek its advice on 
high-profile legal questions—may suggest that, on balance, OLC 
enhances the overall ability of Presidents to take their preferred actions. 
The mechanism for that enhancement is that, when embarking upon a 
controversial course of action, the President is in a better position to 
defend the action’s legality if he can point to an OLC opinion upholding 
it.100 Contrary to what some scholars could be read to suggest,101 however, 
                                                                                                                 
99. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Libyan Legal Limbo: Why There’s Nothing 
Wrong with Obama Ignoring Some of His Own Legal Advisers on Libya, Slate, July 5, 2011, 
, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/06/libyan_legal_
limbo.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“A president need not have or consult 
any legal advisers at all; nothing prevents Obama from shutting down OLC and the other 
executive branch legal offices altogether and deciding the administration’s legal positions 
for himself.”). Professors Posner and Vermeule go too far in saying that “nothing prevents 
Obama from shutting down OLC.” A combination of statutory and regulatory provisions 
provides for OLC’s existence. See 28 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) (“The President shall appoint, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 11 Assistant Attorneys General, who shall 
assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2012) 
(listing matters assigned to OLC, including “[p]reparing the formal opinions of the 
Attorney General; rendering informal opinions and legal advice to the various agencies of 
the Government; and assisting the Attorney General in the performance of his functions 
as legal adviser to the President and as a member of, and legal adviser to, the Cabinet”). In 
light of these provisions and OLC’s well-established history, Congress (and especially the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, which oversees the Department of Justice) surely expects that 
OLC will continue to exist. A presidential decision to shut down OLC would likely provoke 
substantial congressional backlash. Moreover, dismantling OLC would return its legal 
advisory function to the Attorney General, in whom such authority has been vested by 
statute ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 
73, 92–93 (creating office of Attorney General of United States and assigning to it certain 
responsibilities, including giving “advice and opinion upon questions of law when 
required by the President . . . or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, 
touching any matters that may concern their departments”). That function is now codified 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–513. The President of course is not obliged to follow the Attorney 
General’s legal advice, but it would be practically impossible for him to shut down that 
office. 
100. See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and 
the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. F. 62, 64 (2011), 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124_forum_morrison.pdf [hereinafter 
Morrison, Libya] (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[S]ignaling and maintaining a 
willingness to treat OLC’s legal advice as presumptively binding enhances the credibility of 
a president’s claims of good faith and respect for the law, which in turn can help generate 
public support for his actions.”).  
101. See, e.g., Ackerman, Decline, supra note 5, at 106 (characterizing OLC as “a 
legal apologist for presidential power”); Eric A. Posner, Deference to the Executive in the 
United States After September 11: Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel, 
35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 213, 228–29 (2012) [hereinafter Posner, Deference to the 
Executive] (“The OLC does not constrain the executive but enables him to accomplish 
goals that he would not otherwise be able to accomplish.”). 
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this does not establish that OLC invariably enhances presidential power. 
An OLC opinion affirming the President’s policies may be fairly said to 
empower him on that issue. But OLC does not always say yes,102 and the 
absence of an OLC opinion in the President’s favor likely makes it more 
difficult for him to pursue that course of action than if there were no 
OLC at all.103 Whether that amounts to an overall restriction or enhance-
ment of presidential power may be impossible to judge. 
More fundamentally, the mere fact that law in general—and certain 
legal offices like OLC in particular—both enable and constrain 
presidential action in an aggregate sense does not speak in any meaning-
ful way to whether law constrains the President in specific exercises of his 
authority. The latter question, we believe, is what most people have in 
mind when considering whether law constrains the President, and it is 
the focus of this Essay. That is, we ask whether, when the President takes 
a particular action, the law acts as a constraint. But it is also worth 
emphasizing that the ability of legal argumentation to enable presiden-
tial authority at the wholesale level may itself corroborate the possibility 
of legal constraint at the retail level. If all law relating to presidential 
authority were merely epiphenomenal, it is not clear why legal 
argumentation would have any capacity to enhance such authority.104 
D. Relationship Between Law and Enforcement 
One of the grounds of skepticism about whether the presidency is 
constrained by law concerns the frequent lack of formal enforcement 
mechanisms. There is an extensive jurisprudential literature on whether 
and to what extent enforcement is necessary in order for norms to 
qualify as law.105 Modern perspectives on law, in the tradition of H.L.A. 
Hart, tend to de-emphasize the importance of external enforcement and 
focus instead on internal perceptions, a point we return to in Part III. For 
present purposes, we simply note two things. First, a norm need not be 
perfectly enforced in order to constrain. Of course, as the legal realists 
emphasized, one cannot get an accurate picture of the law by looking 
                                                                                                                 
102. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1715–21 (finding 
significant number of opinions “predominantly against the White House”). 
103. See Morrison, Libya, supra note 100, at 69–70 (discussing costs to presidential 
credibility of regularly departing from OLC’s analysis, and of failing to seek OLC’s 
opinion on issues that would ordinarily go to OLC). 
104. Cf. Posner, Deference to the Executive, supra note 101, at 230 (suggesting OLC 
enables exercise of executive power by “convey[ing] information to the President about 
the constraints on executive power that are imposed from outside the executive branch”). 
105. See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, Enforcement and the Concept of Law, 121 Yale 
L.J. Online 293 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/1029.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
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only at the law on the books rather than the law in action.106 Our point 
here, however, is simply that the lack of perfect enforcement of a legal rule 
does not mean the rule does not exist, or that it does not constrain. The 
fact that homicides continue to be committed in the United States—and 
that not everyone who commits such a crime is apprehended and 
prosecuted—does not remove or render meaningless the legal prohibi-
tion against homicide.  
Second, enforcement need not be formal. Domestic criminal laws, of 
course, are typically implemented through a range of formal 
enforcement mechanisms, such as state-sanctioned incarceration. Even 
such formal modes of enforcement, however, are probably enhanced by 
informal mechanisms such as public shaming and exclusion. For 
example, the formal punishment-based deterrence against committing 
an offense like embezzlement is likely enhanced by a desire to avoid 
public embarrassment and a worry about the difficulty of obtaining 
future employment.107 
Even when the likely enforcement mechanisms are entirely informal, 
we think they should count for purposes of evaluating whether law 
operates as a constraint. For some issues of presidential power, there are 
very few potential modes of formal enforcement (impeachment may be 
the only formal mode), and the likelihood that they would be employed 
to sanction any particular presidential act is generally very low. But there 
may still be enforcement through informal mechanisms such as congres-
sional backlash and public disapproval. If those enforcement measures 
are triggered or intensified at least in part by the legal status of a norm, 
then we believe one can meaningfully describe them as a type of legal 
enforcement. On this point it is worth noting that, outside of the area of 
constitutional law, it is generally accepted that law can act as a constraint 
even when it takes the form of customary norms, and even when it is 
subject primarily to informal enforcement. There is a rich literature, for 
example, on the customary “law merchant” in medieval Europe, the 
enforcement of which was based heavily on reputation.108 Gillian 
Hadfield and Barry Weingast have recently supplemented that literature 
with modeling that shows how legal norms in general can be effective 
                                                                                                                 
106. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1222 (1931) (noting “some rules [are] mere paper”).  
107. See generally John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration 101–02 (1989) 
(noting that individuals “having high employment and educational aspirations” are 
particularly vulnerable to stigma of illegality); Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, 
Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 
71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 325 (1980). 
108. E.g., Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons 
from Medieval Trade (2006); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom & Barry R. Weingast, 
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. 
Pol. Econ. 745 (1994).  
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even in the absence of centralized enforcement.109 As applied to 
presidential power, this analysis suggests, once again, that the inter-
relationship of law and politics does not by itself negate the importance 
of law. 
E. Relevance of Judicial Review 
As the discussion of enforcement should make clear, we do not 
believe that judicial review is a prerequisite to concluding that law, 
including practice-based constitutional law relating to presidential 
power, operates as a legal constraint. In this respect, we depart from 
some understandings of British (and, more broadly, Commonwealth) 
constitutional law. Britain has an unwritten constitution, and British 
commentators—most famously, A.V. Dicey—have distinguished between 
constitutional law and “constitutional conventions” largely on the basis of 
judicial enforceability.110 On Dicey’s account, British constitutional law 
includes only judicially enforceable rules, while constitutional 
conventions “consist of conventions, understandings, habits, or practices 
which . . . regulate the conduct of the several members of the sovereign 
power . . . [but] are not in reality laws at all since they are not enforced 
by the Courts.”111 As depicted by Dicey, the substantive domain of 
constitutional conventions overlaps substantially with that of the practice-
based norms with which this Essay is concerned. For several reasons, 
however, we do not think that this similarity precludes calling those 
norms “law.” 
First, in denying the label “law” to constitutional conventions, Dicey 
was not relegating them to an undifferentiated realm of mere politics. 
Instead, he was identifying a set of practices fairly described as constitu-
tional in nature, which could be thought to carry a special normative 
force because of their constitutional status even though they were not 
legally enforceable in the courts. Second, Dicey developed his account 
against the background of an Austinian conception of law that viewed 
formal sanctions as a crucial element of law, a conception that has been 
substantially disputed by modern legal theorists, most notably H.L.A. 
Hart.112 To the extent that the Austinian conception holds less sway 
today, there is less need to draw a sharp distinction between law and con-
ventions. Third, it is worth noting that not all modern Commonwealth 
                                                                                                                 
109. Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Law Without the State: Legal Attributes 
and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment, 1 J.L. & Courts 3 (2013); 
Gillian K. Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, What is Law? A Coordination Model of the 
Characteristics of Legal Order, 4 J. Legal Analysis 471 (2012). 
110. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution ch. 14 (3d 
ed., London, MacMillan & Co. 1889). 
111. Id. at 24. 
112. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law ch. 3 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994). 
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legal theorists embrace that sharp distinction.113 Of particular signifi-
cance here, many scholars today suggest that conventions can play a 
limited role in litigated controversies and thus are not strictly extra-
judicial.114 Finally, whatever the proper label in Britain or other 
Commonwealth countries, in the U.S. context the notion that constitu-
tional law is not law unless it is judicially enforceable does not fit with the 
political question and other nonjusticiability doctrines, which readily 
accept that constitutional law extends beyond what the courts do.115  
To better accord with understandings of U.S. law, it may be useful to 
distinguish between constitutional conventions that have a legally 
normative character and those that do not, regardless of whether they 
are subject to judicial review.116 Under this conception, what makes a 
convention nonlegal is not simply the unwillingness of courts to enforce 
it. Rather, it is that members of the relevant community do not under-
stand its breach to be a violation of the law, even if they understand it to 
be improper behavior. So, for example, a violation of the convention of 
senatorial courtesy for judicial appointments, or perhaps even of the pre-
Twenty-Second Amendment convention against Presidents serving more 
than two terms, might be viewed as normatively improper but not 
necessarily unconstitutional. Whether the convention qualified as law, in 
                                                                                                                 
113. See, e.g., Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution 74 (5th ed. 1959) 
(arguing conventions “are rules whose nature does not differ fundamentally from that of 
the positive law of England”); see also Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The 
Rules and Forms of Political Accountability 12–13 (1984) (discussing this issue). 
114. See, e.g., N.W. Barber, The Constitutional State 90 (2011); Marshall, supra note 
113, at 13–17. As Adrian Vermeule describes, “[C]ourts may not directly enforce 
conventions against other political actors, in the sense that courts may not invoke 
freestanding conventions to override written legal rules. However, courts may indirectly 
recognize and incorporate conventions in the course of performing their . . . duty of 
interpreting written laws or rules of common law.” Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of 
Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript at 15) 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
115. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Government officials must make a conscious decision to obey 
the Constitution whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law and then 
must conform their actions to these principled determinations.”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 
U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“The issue [before the Court] is not whether 
severe partisan gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to 
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”). Nor does limiting the 
category of constitutional law to that which is enforced by the courts accord with the 
scholarly emphasis in recent years on constitutional law outside the courts. E.g., Larry D. 
Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004); 
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts ch. 1 (1999). 
116. Other scholars who have focused on U.S. constitutional conventions have not 
taken account of this potential distinction. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America’s 
Unwritten Constitution ch. 9 (2012); Herbert W. Horwill, The Usages of the American 
Constitution ch. 12 (1925). 
1130 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1097 
  
other words, would depend on whether the convention met certain 
accepted rules of recognition.117  
To be sure, it may be difficult to distinguish between legally 
normative conventions and other normative conventions, since the 
courts may not enforce either one, and the informal sanctions for their 
breach may be similar. Presumably, however, debates about alleged 
breaches of legally normative conventions will be surrounded by analysis 
couched in legal terms, whereas debates about potential breaches of 
other conventions will not. Relatedly, if the convention is understood as 
legal in character, then within the executive branch it is likely that 
lawyers will play a fairly important role in interpreting and applying it. 
The legal quality of the norm, in other words, may be reflected in the 
identity of the personnel with primary responsibility for analyzing and 
implementing it. The identity of the personnel could in turn affect the 
likelihood of constraints, as discussed below in Part III. Moreover, 
because they are based on evolving practice, the status of conventions is 
likely not fixed, and thus some nonlegal conventions presumably could 
evolve into legal norms, and, conversely, some conventions understood 
as legal might lose that character over time. The key point is that the 
distinction would not turn on the existence or nonexistence of judicial 
review. 
Insisting on a sharp distinction between the law governing presiden-
tial authority that is subject to judicial review and the law that is not also 
takes for granted a phenomenon that merits attention—that Presidents 
follow judicial decisions.118 That assumption is generally accurate in the 
United States today. To take one relatively recent example, despite dis-
agreeing with the Supreme Court’s determination in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to the war on 
terror, the Bush Administration quickly accepted it.119 But the reason why 
Presidents abide by court decisions has a connection to the broader issue 
                                                                                                                 
117. H.L.A. Hart famously argued that legal systems depend on having shared “rules 
of recognition” for determining which norms are legally binding. Under this view, “custom 
is law only if it is one of a class of customs which is ‘recognized’ as law by a particular legal 
system.” Hart, supra note 112, at 44–45. See generally The Rule of Recognition and the 
U.S. Constitution (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds., 2009) (considering 
application of rule of recognition to U.S. constitutional law).  
118. See Roger Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 
1132 (1961) (“Whether or not governments are theoretically capable of legal limitation, 
they do regularly submit to adverse court decisions.”); Levinson, Parchment, supra note 
14, at 661 (“Casting courts as constitutional enforcers merely pushes the question back to 
why powerful political actors are willing to pay attention to what judges say; why ‘people 
with money and guns ever submit to people armed only with gavels.’” (quoting Matthew C. 
Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations of Independent 
Judicial Review, 32 J. Legal Stud. 59, 60 (2003))). 
119. See Mark Mazzeti & Kate Zernike, White House Says Terror Detainees Hold 
Basic Rights, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2006, at A1. 
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of the constraining effect of law. An executive obligation to comply with 
judicial decisions is itself part of the practice-based constitutional law of the 
United States, so presidential compliance with this obligation may 
demonstrate that such law can in fact constrain the President. This is 
true, as we explain further in Part III, even if the effect on presidential 
behavior is motivated by concerns about external political perceptions 
rather than an internal sense of fidelity to law (or judicial review).120 
A final complication is that, with respect to issues of presidential 
power, there are few situations in which the prospect of judicial review is 
actually zero. If the Supreme Court can decide Bush v. Gore121 and the war 
on terror cases, it can decide a lot.122 Areas of presidential power that 
typically see little judicial involvement might become areas of greater 
involvement under certain conditions. Moreover, the likelihood of 
judicial review is probably affected by the extent to which courts perceive 
the President to be stretching traditional legal understandings. As a 
result, it might be more accurate to describe the constitutional law of 
presidential power as judicially underenforced, rather than unenforce-
able. Even outside the separation of powers area, there is an extensive 
literature on the legal status of underenforced constitutional norms. For 
a variety of reasons, including justiciability limitations, immunity 
doctrines, and judicial deference to coordinate institutions, it has long 
been understood that the Constitution is not fully enforced by the courts. 
Nevertheless, courts and scholars commonly accept that judicially 
underenforced constitutional norms retain the status of law beyond the 
extent of judicial enforcement.123 
                                                                                                                 
120. Cf. Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 1018 (“[I]f we ask why 
elected officials . . . accede so readily to claims of judicial authority . . . , part of the answer 
can be traced to the external constraint that public expectations impose. . . . [T]he public 
has been socialized to believe that judicial interpretations are legally binding.”). 
121. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
122. The Supreme Court also recently signaled a narrow view of the political 
question doctrine, even in the area of foreign affairs. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. 
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012) (describing political question doctrine as “narrow 
exception” to judiciary’s “responsibility to decide cases properly before it”). 
123. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1274, 1299 (2006); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair 
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 
1221 (1978); see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 137–38 (1893) (observing “much which is harmful 
and unconstitutional may take effect without any capacity in the courts to prevent it, since 
their whole power is a judicial one”). But cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and 
Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 904–05 (1999) (emphasizing connection 
between constitutional rights and remedial substantiation, while noting “[p]erhaps . . . 
constitutional rights may have an effect on government behavior independent of formal, 
state-imposed sanctions for noncompliance”). 
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III. POSSIBLE MECHANISMS OF CONSTRAINT 
Having specified in the previous Part what counts as legal constraint 
in our view, this Part considers how legal constraints might work with 
respect to the presidency. It first examines two familiar potential 
mechanisms of constraint: the internalization of legal norms by relevant 
actors within the executive branch and the threat of external sanctions 
for violating those norms. This Part then discusses the implications of an 
obvious but less-discussed phenomenon—the fact that executive officials 
frequently engage in public dialogue about the President’s constitutional 
authority, including his practice-based authority. It concludes by 
analyzing the debate over the military intervention in Libya, mentioned 
earlier, in order to highlight some of the challenges associated with 
empirically studying the ways in which the presidency may be constrained 
by law.  
A. Norm Internalization 
Perhaps the most obvious way that law can have a constraining effect 
is if the relevant actors have internalized the legal norms, whether those 
norms are embodied in authoritative text, judicial decisions, or 
institutional practice. As a general matter, the internalization of legal 
norms is a phenomenon that can potentially take place wherever the law 
is thought to operate, in both the private and public sectors. But 
precisely how that internalization operates, including how it affects actual 
conduct, depends heavily on institutional context. When speaking of 
legal norm internalization as it relates to the presidency, it is important 
first to note that Presidents act through a wide array of agencies and 
departments, and that presidential decisions are informed—and often 
made, for all practical purposes—by officials other than the President. In 
most instances involving presidential power, therefore, the relevant 
question is whether there has been an internalization of legal norms by 
the executive branch.  
The executive branch contains thousands of lawyers.124 The 
President and other executive officials are regularly advised by these 
lawyers, and sometimes they themselves are lawyers. Although lawyers 
serve in a wide variety of roles throughout the executive branch, their 
                                                                                                                 
124. Estimates of the number of lawyers working in federal government vary. See, 
e.g., David Fontana, Executive Branch Legalisms, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 21, 21 (2012), 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol126_fontana.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (“Every business day approximately 20,000 lawyers head to their jobs 
in the federal government.”); Erin Delmore & Marisa M. Kashino, How Many Lawyers Are 
There?, Washingtonian, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/
how-many-lawyers-are-there (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating, in late 2009, 
Office of Personnel Management reported “the number of practicing lawyers in all 
executive departments and agencies across the country [was] 31,797”). 
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experience of attending law school means that they have all had a 
common socialization—a socialization that typically entails taking law 
seriously on its own terms.125 Moreover, the law schools attended by 
virtually all U.S. government lawyers are American law schools, which 
means that the lawyers are socialized in an ethos associated with the 
American polity and the American style of law and government.126 These 
lawyers are also part of a professional community (including the state 
bars to which they are admitted) with at least a loosely shared set of 
norms of argumentative plausibility. 
Certain legal offices within the executive branch have developed 
their own distinctive law-internalizing practices. This is particularly true 
in places like OLC, which, as noted above, provides legal advice based on 
its best view of the law. OLC has developed a range of practices and 
traditions—including a strong norm of adhering to its own precedents 
even across administrations—that help give it some distance and relative 
independence from the immediate political and policy preferences of its 
clients across the executive branch, and that make it easier for OLC to 
act on its own internalization of legal norms.127 Another example is the 
State Department Legal Adviser’s Office, which often takes the lead 
within the executive branch on matters of international law and which 
has developed its own set of traditions and practices that help protect it 
from undue pressure from its clients.128  
More broadly, government legal offices may internalize legal norms 
even if they do not regularly focus on identifying the best view of the law. 
For example, an office committed not to seeking the best view of the law 
but to providing professionally responsible legal defenses of certain 
already-determined policy positions could still operate under legal 
constraints if it took the limits of professional responsibility seriously. 
                                                                                                                 
125. See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 777, 827 (2012) (reviewing Posner & Vermeule, The Executive Unbound, supra note 
5) (“[L]awyers trained in this [legal] tradition currently staff the length and breadth of 
the executive branch.”). 
126. This socialization includes exposure to legal ethics, which all ABA-accredited law 
schools are required to teach. See Am. Bar Assoc., 2012–2013 ABA Standards and Rules of 
Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302(a)(5) & Interpretation 302-9 
(2012).  
127. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 
110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448 (2010). But see Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of 
the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676, 728 (2005) (questioning 
ability of Office of Solicitor General and OLC to constrain presidential decisionmaking in 
absence of likelihood of judicial review). 
128. See Fontana, supra note 124, at 45 (suggesting Legal Adviser’s Office, like OLC, 
has “legitimacy created by long-standing tradition”); Harold Hongju Koh, The State 
Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight Decades in Peace and War, 100 Geo. L.J. 1747, 
1749 (2012) (contending “a rich set of traditions, customs, expectations, and norms . . . 
together ensure [the Legal Adviser’s Office’s] quality, integrity, and relevance”).  
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That may well describe the typical posture of agency general counsel 
offices across the executive branch. As noted above, although it can be 
difficult to identify with consistent precision the outer boundaries of 
legal plausibility, a commitment to remaining within those boundaries is 
a commitment to a type of legal constraint.  
If executive branch legal offices operate on the basis of certain 
internalized norms that treat law as a constraint, the next question is 
whether those offices have any effect on the actual conduct of the 
executive branch. In the case of OLC, there are two key points. First, 
although OLC possesses virtually no “mandatory” jurisdiction, there is a 
general expectation that, outside the litigation context, legal questions of 
special complexity, controversy, or importance will be put to OLC to 
address.129 Second, established traditions treat OLC’s legal conclusions as 
presumptively binding within the executive branch, unless overruled by 
the Attorney General or the President (which happens extremely 
rarely).130 Combined, these practices make OLC the most significant 
source of centralized legal advice within the Executive Branch. 
Still, OLC addresses only a very small fraction of all the legal 
questions that arise within the executive branch, and a complete picture 
of the extent to which executive officials internalize legal norms (or are 
affected by others who internalize such norms) must extend well beyond 
                                                                                                                 
129. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1733 (suggesting 
issues that should go to OLC include “(1) legal issues that OLC has a history of addressing 
and on which it therefore has an accumulated jurisprudence and expertise; (2) significant 
issues of executive power; and (3) programs or policies likely to trigger substantial public 
attention and/or controversy”); Memorandum from Walter E. Dellinger et al., Principles 
to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. 21, 2004), reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, 
Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1559 app. 2 at 1610 (2007) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum] (stating OLC 
should be consulted “on all major executive branch initiatives and activities that raise 
significant legal questions”). 
130. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to Att’ys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, 
Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1 (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter 
2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-
legal-advice-opinions.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating OLC “provide[s] 
controlling advice to Executive Branch officials on questions of law”); Memorandum from 
Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Att’ys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Best Practices for OLC Opinions 1 (May 16, 2005) 
[hereinafter 2005 OLC Best Practices Memorandum], available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/olc/best-practices.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[S]ubject 
to the President’s authority under the Constitution, OLC opinions are controlling on 
questions of law within the Executive Branch.”); Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 129, 
at 1603 (“OLC’s legal determinations are considered binding on the executive branch, 
subject to the supervision of the Attorney General and the ultimate authority of the 
President.”). 
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that office.131 Looking across the executive branch more broadly, there 
may be a practical imperative driving at least some measure of legal norm 
internalization. The executive branch is a vast bureaucracy, or series of 
bureaucracies. Executive officials responsible for discharging the gov-
ernment’s various policy mandates cannot act effectively without a basic 
understanding of who is responsible for what, and how government 
power is to be exercised—all topics regulated by law, including practice-
based law.132 Some of the understandings produced by those allocations 
are probably so internalized that the relevant actors cannot even imagine 
(at least in any serious way) a different regime.133 
Even on the more high-profile policy questions that receive the 
attention of the White House itself, the internalization of law may have a 
constraining effect. There are lawyers in the White House, of course, 
including the Office of Counsel to the President (otherwise known as the 
White House Counsel’s Office). Some commentators—most notably 
Bruce Ackerman, as part of his general claim that the executive branch 
tends toward illegality—have characterized that office as populated by 
“superloyalists” who face “an overwhelming incentive to tell [the 
President] that the law allows [him] to do whatever [he] want[s] to 
do.”134 If that were an accurate portrayal, it would suggest that there is 
little to no internalization of the law in the White House Counsel’s 
Office. But there are serious descriptive deficiencies in that account.135 
                                                                                                                 
131. As David Fontana has noted, “[O]n many issues, civil service lawyers are 
functionally and/or formally the final actor in the executive branch,” and “even when a 
legal issue does reach the political lawyers, it usually arrives on their desk after civil service 
lawyers have already framed the issue in important ways, and it is difficult to diverge from 
these civil service framings.” Fontana, supra note 124, at 42.  
132. See Pildes, Law and the President, supra note 92, at 1407 (observing that, as 
matter of “internal organizational efficacy, as well as effective cooperation with other parts 
of the government, law serves an essential coordination function”). 
133. For a general discussion of how law can affect what people take for granted and 
how they understand their potential actions, see Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: 
Rational, Normative and Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 
Wis. L. Rev. 475. 
134. Ackerman, Decline, supra note 5, at 12, 176. 
135. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1731–41. Among other 
things, Ackerman’s account misses the fact that in some areas—executive privilege, for 
example—the White House Counsel’s concern for protecting the constitutional 
prerogatives of the office of the presidency can lead it to advise the President to assert his 
authority more robustly than he deems desirable as a political matter. See Maryanne 
Borrelli et al., The White House Counsel’s Office, 31 Presidential Stud. Q. 561, 562 (2001) 
(quoting A.B. Culvahouse, former White House Counsel under President Reagan, as 
saying Counsel is “the last and in some cases the only protector of the president’s 
constitutional privileges,” and “[a]lmost everyone else is willing to give those away . . . inch 
by inch . . . to win the issue of the day, to achieve compromise”). In this way, politics does 
not always push in the direction of violating legal limits on presidential power. The 
relationship between law and politics in the White House and elsewhere is more 
complicated than that.  
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Still, the White House Counsel’s immediate proximity to and close 
working relationship with the President and his senior political advisors 
surely do cause politics to suffuse much of the work of that office in a way 
that is not true of all of the executive branch.  
The more fundamental point, however, is that it is in the nature of 
modern government that the President’s power to act often depends at 
least in part on the input and actions of offices and departments outside 
the White House. That commonly includes the input of legal offices from 
elsewhere across the executive branch.136 Many of those offices are 
headed by political appointees, and thus politics are not likely to be 
wholly absent from their work either. But many of those offices are also 
populated primarily by nonpolitical “career” civil servants, whose work as 
government lawyers across presidential administrations likely increases 
the internalization of relevant legal norms. To the extent that the input 
and actions of such offices affect the President’s ability to act, he may be 
constrained by law without regard to whether he or his most senior 
White House advisers think about the law.  
Internalization of legal norms may at least partially explain the now-
famous standoff during the George W. Bush Administration between 
high-ranking lawyers in the Justice Department and various White House 
officials over the legality of a then-secret warrantless surveillance 
program. The program was deeply important to the White House, but 
the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and head of OLC all 
refused to certify the legality of the program unless certain changes were 
made. When the White House threatened to proceed with the program 
without certification from the Justice Department, the leaders of the 
Department (along with the Director of the FBI and others) all prepared 
to resign. Ultimately, the White House backed down and acceded to the 
changes.137 Some substantial part of the explanation for why the Justice 
Department officials acted as they did seems to lie in their internalization 
of a set of institutional norms that not only takes law seriously as a 
constraint, but that insists on a degree of independence in determining 
                                                                                                                 
136. For a discussion of the reasons why the White House does not routinely rely on 
the legal advice of the White House Counsel’s Office on questions that will ordinarily go to 
OLC—and why it is not in the interests of the White House to do so—see Morrison, 
Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1741–42; Morrison, Libya, supra note 100, at 
63–64, 70–74.  
137. This episode, including a standoff between White House and Justice 
Department officials at Attorney General John Ashcroft’s hospital bedside, was recounted 
in subsequent congressional testimony by James Comey, who had been Deputy Attorney 
General at the time of the incident. See Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the 
Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 213–20 (2007) (statement of James B. 
Comey, former Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States). For further discussion of the 
confrontation between the Justice Department and the White House on this issue, see 
Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 286–320 (2008). 
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what the law requires.138 Buckling under pressure from the White House 
was evidently inconsistent with the Justice Department officials’ under-
standing of their professional roles.  
B. External Sanctions 
In addition to the constraining influence arising from the internali-
zation of legal norms by executive branch lawyers and other officials, law 
could constrain the President if there are “external” sanctions for 
violating it. The core idea here is a familiar one, often associated with 
Holmes’s “bad man”139: One who obeys the law only because he 
concludes that the cost of noncompliance exceeds the benefits is still 
subject to legal constraint if the cost of noncompliance is affected by the 
legal status of the norm. This is true even though the law is likely to 
impose less of a constraint on such “bad men” than on those who have 
internalized legal norms, and even though it is likely to be difficult in 
practice to disentangle internal and external constraints.  
Importantly, external sanctions for noncompliance need not be 
formal. If the existence or intensity of an informal sanction is affected by 
the legal status of the norm in question, compliance with the norm in 
order to avoid the sanction should be understood as an instance of law 
having a constraining effect. In the context of presidential compliance 
with the law, one can plausibly posit a number of such informal 
sanctions. One operates on the level of professional reputation, and may 
be especially salient for lawyers in the executive branch. If a lawyer’s own 
internalization of the relevant set of legal norms is insufficient to prevent 
him from defending as lawful actions that he knows are obviously beyond 
the pale, he might respond differently if he believed his legal analysis 
would or could be disclosed to the broader legal community in a way that 
would threaten his reputation and professional prospects after he leaves 
government.140 (This concern might help further explain the OLC and 
                                                                                                                 
138. For example, Barton Gellman has reported a conversation between President 
Bush and Acting Attorney General James Comey, where President Bush said to Comey, “I 
decide what the law is for the executive branch,” to which Comey replied, “That’s 
absolutely true, sir, you do. But I decide what the Department of Justice can certify to and 
can’t certify to, and despite my absolute best efforts I simply cannot in the circumstances.” 
Gellman, supra note 137, at 318. 
139. See Holmes, supra note 96, at 459; see also supra notes 95–96 and 
accompanying text.  
140. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 
112 Colum. L. Rev. 507, 546 (2012) (“Attorneys in the OLC, both careerists and their 
political supervisors, wish to maintain the OLC’s reputation as being above politics, in 
part, because their future career prospects are tied to it.”); Morrison, Constitutional 
Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1725 (“Disclosing OLC’s work implicates its lawyers’ 
professional reputations, which in turn encourages them to avoid behavior that would cast 
them in a bad light.”).  
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other Justice Department officials’ resistance to the White House in the 
warrantless surveillance example discussed above.) 
Although fear of harm to their professional reputations may indeed 
help constrain government lawyers, if that were the only operative 
external sanction in this context it would be fair to ask whether it 
translated into a real constraint on the President in high-stakes contexts. 
But it is not the only potential sanction. A related and perhaps more 
significant sanction may operate directly on political leaders within the 
government, including the President himself: partisan politics. If being 
perceived to act lawlessly is politically costly, a President’s political rivals 
will have an incentive to invoke the law to oppose him. Put another way, 
legal argumentation might have a salience with the media, the public at 
large, and influential elites that could provide presidential opponents in 
Congress and elsewhere with an incentive to criticize executive actions in 
legal terms. If such criticism gains traction in a given context, it could 
enable the President’s congressional opponents to impose even greater 
costs on him through a variety of means, ranging from oversight hearings 
to, in the extreme case, threats of impeachment. Thus, so long as the 
threat of such sanctions is credible, law will impose an external 
constraint—whether or not the President himself or those responsible 
for carrying out his policies have internalized the law as a normative 
matter. The prospect of political sanctions might help explain, for 
example, why modern Presidents do not seem to seriously contemplate 
disregarding Supreme Court decisions.141 And if Presidents are con-
strained to follow the practice-based norm of judicial supremacy, they 
may be constrained to follow other normative practices that do not 
involve the courts. 
Work by political scientists concerning the use of military force is at 
least suggestive of how a connection between public sanctions and law 
compliance might work. As this work shows, the opposition party in 
Congress, especially during times of divided government, will have both 
an incentive and the means to use the media to criticize unsuccessful 
presidential uses of force. The additional political costs that the 
opposition party is able to impose in this way will in turn make it less 
likely that Presidents will engage in large-scale military operations.142 It is 
at least conceivable, as the legal theorist Fred Schauer has suggested, that 
the political cost of pursuing an ultimately unpopular policy initiative 
(such as engaging in a war) goes up with the perceived illegality of the 
                                                                                                                 
141. Cf. Levinson, Parchment, supra note 14, at 661 (explaining “an effective system 
of constitutional law must be in some sense self-enforcing regardless of judicial review” 
because powerful political actors need some reason to adhere to judiciary’s 
pronouncements). 
142. See, e.g., William G. Howell & Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: 
Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers 155 (2007); Douglas L. Kriner, After the 
Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War 147 (2010). 
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initiative.143 If that is correct, then actors will require more assurance of 
policy success before potentially violating the law. This should count as a 
legal constraint on policymaking even if the relevant actors themselves 
do not see any normative significance in the legal rule in question. 
Moreover, even if Madisonian checks and balances do not work 
systematically, in at least some instances Congress (or a particular house 
of Congress) is likely to use its institutional authority to resist what it 
perceives to be unlawful presidential behavior. For example, consider the 
phenomenon of “congressional-executive agreements,” which are 
international agreements concluded by the United States with the 
support of a majority of both houses of Congress rather than the two-
thirds advice and consent of the Senate that Article II of the Constitution 
specifies for treaties. A large percentage of the international agreements 
entered into by the United States since the 1930s have taken the form of 
congressional-executive agreements,144 but there is substantial debate 
and uncertainty about the extent to which the congressional-executive 
agreement process is constitutionally interchangeable with the Article II 
treaty process.145 For some subject areas, bipartisan leadership in the 
Senate has insisted that the Constitution requires resort to the Article II 
process, and in these instances Presidents have generally acceded to the 
Senate’s position. This is particularly evident in the area of arms 
control,146 although it seems likely that there would be similar senatorial 
                                                                                                                 
143. See Schauer, Political Risks, supra note 93, at 84–85. But cf. Frederick Schauer, 
Is Legality Political?, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481, 505 (2011) (suggesting possibility that 
“the practice of following the law just because it is the law . . . is far less rewarded by the 
electorate and in public political life than is commonly supposed”). 
144. See Cong. Research Serv., Treaties and Other International Agreements: The 
Role of the United States Senate 38–39 (Comm. Print 2001). 
145. Compare, e.g., Ackerman & Golove, supra note 46 (arguing in favor of full 
interchangeability, based on controversial theory of constitutional change), with Spiro, 
Treaties, supra note 46 (arguing historical practice does not support full 
interchangeability). 
146. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 473–74. With the exception of an 
interim agreement in 1972, all major arms control agreements since World War II have 
been concluded as Article II treaties. In providing its advice and consent to various such 
treaties, the Senate has issued accompanying declarations stating that significant arms 
control agreements should be concluded only pursuant to the treaty power and not by 
congressional-executive agreement. See, e.g., Spiro, Treaties, supra note 46, at 997 
(quoting S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-22, at 81 (1991)). In response to Senate pressure in 1997, 
President Clinton abandoned plans to conclude an update to the Treaty on Armed 
Conventional Forces in Europe by means of a congressional-executive agreement and 
instead submitted it to the Senate for approval as an Article II treaty. See Phillip R. 
Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down: The Treaty Power in the Clinton 
Administration, 16 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 55, 56 (1998). In 2002, when President Bush 
suggested an intent to conclude a nuclear arms reduction agreement with Russia and was 
vague about the form it would take, the ranking Democratic and Republican members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wrote to him insisting that any such agreement 
needed to be submitted to the Senate. See Thom Shanker, Senators Insist on Role in 
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resistance to congressional-executive agreements in certain other subject 
areas such as human rights.147 In at least some instances, in other words, 
institutional checks will operate to facilitate the constraining effect of 
law. 
C. Existence of Legal Dialogue 
Although this Essay has divided its discussion of internal and 
external constraints, in many contexts they probably do not operate 
independently. In particular, it seems plausible that practices followed 
out of fear of external sanctions can become internalized as a result of 
habit, or what has been called the “normative power of the actual”—that 
is, the tendency of people to give normative significance to that with 
which they are familiar.148 Conversely, the internalization of a norm 
associated with a practice can plausibly affect the likelihood that actors 
with an interest in the practice will impose external sanctions for viola-
tions. Beyond these general points of interrelation, the internal and ex-
ternal accounts of legal constraint might operate interdependently 
through the existence of something that has received relatively little 
treatment in the literature on presidential power: the simple fact that 
public debate about presidential action frequently includes considera-
tions of legality. The pervasive existence of public “law talk” may itself be 
evidence of, and a mechanism promoting, law’s constraining effect—for 
both internal and external reasons.  
The executive branch almost always endeavors to argue that its 
actions are lawful—and to rebut criticisms to the contrary.149 When 
questions about the legality of a given program or action arise, very 
                                                                                                                 
Nuclear Arms Deals, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2002, at 16. President Bush subsequently did 
submit the agreement to the Senate, and it was approved in 2003, by a vote of 95-0. Amy F. 
Woolf, Cong. Research Serv., RL31448, Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty 16 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31448.pdf 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
147. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 475–76. 
148. The phrase apparently originated with Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre 
[General Theory of the State] 338 (1921); see also Morris Cohen, The Basis of 
Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 582 (1933) (stating ceremonies “have what Jellinek has 
called the normative power of the actual, that is, they control what we do by creating a 
standard of respectability or a pattern to which we feel bound to conform”). 
149. Even President Lincoln’s famous “all the laws, but one” claim—namely that, in 
order to save the Union, he was justified in unilaterally suspending habeas corpus at the 
outset of the Civil War even if it violated the Constitution’s allocation of the suspension 
power—was simply a backup argument. His principal claim was that the suspension was 
fully compliant with the Constitution. See President Abraham Lincoln, Message to 
Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 
421, 429–31 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (asserting privilege of writ of habeas corpus may be 
legally suspended “when, in cases of rebellion, or invasion, the public safety does require 
it”). 
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commonly the executive will release some sort of analysis defending the 
action in legal terms. Recent examples from the Obama Administration 
include its public release, shortly after the March 2011 commencement 
of the U.S. military campaign in Libya, of OLC’s opinion concluding that 
the President had the authority to initiate the campaign without congres-
sional authorization;150 its reliance in the summer of 2011 on written and 
oral testimony from the State Department Legal Adviser that the Libya 
operation did not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of the War 
Powers Resolution;151 and its public release in January 2012 of an OLC 
opinion concluding that the President’s authority to make “recess 
appointments” applied even in an intrasession recess of the Senate, 
during which the Senate met in pro forma session every few days.152 An 
earlier example from the George W. Bush Administration is its public 
release of a December 2005 letter to Congress, followed by a January 
2006 Justice Department white paper, providing legal arguments in 
support of a secret (but recently leaked) terrorist surveillance program 
conducted by the National Security Agency.153  
In all of these examples, the substance (and sometimes the process) 
of the executive branch’s legal arguments faced substantial criticism.154 
                                                                                                                 
150. Krass Memorandum, supra note 33. 
151. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
112th Cong. 14 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State) 
[hereinafter Koh Statement]. 
152. See Memorandum Opinion from Virginia A. Seitz, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, Dep’t of Justice, to the Counsel to the President, Lawfulness of Recess 
Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma 
Sessions (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-
opinion.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
153. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the 
National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted in 81 Ind. 
L.J. 1374 (2006); Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legislative Affs., Dep’t of Justice, to the Leadership of the Senate Select Comm. on 
Intelligence & the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005), 
reprinted in 81 Ind. L.J. 1360 (2006). The program defended in these documents was the 
successor to the program referenced supra at text accompanying notes 137–138. 
154. For criticism of the Obama Administration’s treatment of various legal issues 
relating to the Libya military operation, see, e.g., Glennon, supra note 33, at 1; Morrison, 
Libya, supra note 100, at 65–67; Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, 
N.Y. Times, June 21, 2011, at A27; Editorial, War by Any Other Name, Wash. Post, June 18, 
2011, at A14.  
For criticism of the Bush Administration’s defense of its secret surveillance program, 
see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley et al., February 2, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former 
Government Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department 
Whitepaper of January 19, 2006, in 81 Ind. L.J. 1415 (2006); Curtis A. Bradley et. al, 
January 9, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former Government Officials to Congressional 
Leadership in Response to Justice Department Letter of December 22, 2005, in 81 Ind. L.J. 
1364 (2006); Memorandum from David Kris, Former Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Jan. 25, 
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Indeed, we have advanced some of those criticisms in other writings. Our 
point here, however, is not to parse the specific merits of the arguments 
advanced in any of these examples. Instead, our point is to underscore 
the fact that, in each example, legal argumentation was evidently seen as 
a critical component of the public defense of the executive’s actions. 
Legality apparently had sufficient salience for the executive branch to 
attend to it, and to do so in a way that could hope to seem persuasive or 
at least plausible to interested audiences.  
Certain institutional design features also reflect an appreciation of 
the value to the President of credible legal argumentation. Perhaps most 
notably, the maintenance of an OLC whose traditions at least partially 
insulate it from political pressures, together with the practice of treating 
OLC’s opinions as presumptively binding across the executive branch, 
collectively reflect an understanding that OLC’s opinions are most 
valuable if they appear to take the law seriously, and that presidential 
invocations of such opinions are most effective when they do not appear 
purely opportunistic. Similar observations could be made about certain 
other executive branch legal offices. The Solicitor General’s Office, for 
example, which relies on a staff composed primarily of career attorneys 
to represent the United States before the Supreme Court, is influential in 
part because of the perception that it has a degree of political independ-
ence.155 The Justice Department also has an Office of Professional 
Responsibility that is charged with “investigating allegations of mis-
conduct involving Department attorneys that relate to the exercise of 
their authority to investigate, litigate or provide legal advice, as well as 
allegations of misconduct by law enforcement personnel when related to 
allegations of attorney misconduct within the jurisdiction of OPR.”156 
                                                                                                                 
2006), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/kris.fisa.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
For criticism of OLC’s defense of President Obama’s 2012 recess appointments, see, 
e.g., Executive Overreach: The President’s Unprecedented “Recess” Appointments: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10–20 (2012) (statement of 
Charles J. Cooper, Partner, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC); Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, Op-
Ed., Obama’s Abuse of Power, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 2012, at A17.  
155. See, e.g., Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, The Solicitor General and the United 
States Supreme Court: Executive Branch Influence and Judicial Decisions 136 (2012) 
(concluding that influence of Solicitor General’s Office on Supreme Court likely comes 
from Office’s “objectivity, professionalism, and independence”). 
156. Office of Prof’l Responsibility, About OPR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www
.justice.gov/opr/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). In 
2009, the Office concluded that the OLC attorneys involved in drafting the infamous 
“torture memos” during the Bush Administration had committed “professional 
misconduct” by failing to provide “thorough, candid, and objective” analysis. Office of 
Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t Just., Report: Investigation into the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 11 (2009), available 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf (on file with the 
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More generally, the decision to devote resources to producing 
credible legal defenses of executive actions suggests that legality is 
salient. This salience could be the product of either of the two basic 
causal mechanisms identified above. It could be the result of certain 
executive officials’ internalization of legal norms, or it could reflect a 
Holmesian understanding of the costs associated with being perceived to 
act illegally. As to the latter, the very fact that an administration publicly 
invokes a given legal principle to defend its actions can create pressure 
for the administration to respect that principle over time. This is what 
Jon Elster calls the “civilizing force of hypocrisy.”157 As Elster explains, 
“[P]ublic speaking is subject to a consistency constraint. Once a speaker 
has adopted an impartial argument because it corresponds to his interest 
or prejudice, he will be seen as opportunistic if he deviates from it when 
it ceases to serve his needs.”158 Although this constraint is not unique to 
legal dialogue, it helps explain why supplying public legal justifications 
for one’s actions can serve to constrain future actions. 
Over time, moreover, the internal and external constraints might 
merge. If successfully defending the legality of one’s actions has a 
political value, law may come to be partly constitutive of an official’s 
preferences. Rational choice perspectives on individual and institutional 
behavior sometimes appear to take an actor’s interests as fixed and then 
to examine various strategies for maximizing those interests. Yet it seems 
plausible to posit a more dynamic relationship. Political self-interest 
might not only incentivize attentiveness to law but also become partially 
constituted by the perceived legal status of one’s actions.159 A President, 
for example, might be committed to defending the legality of his actions 
                                                                                                                 
Columbia Law Review). On review, the Justice Department agreed with many of the Office’s 
criticisms of the memos but rejected the Office’s finding of professional misconduct. See 
Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report Faults 2 Who Wrote Terror Memos, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
20, 2010, at A1. 
157. Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution 236, 
250 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (emphasis omitted); see also Ian Johnstone, Law-
Making Through the Operational Activities of International Organizations, 40 Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 87, 120–21 (2008) (“Having made rhetorical commitments, speakers feel 
some pressure to match their words with deeds. Otherwise, they would be branded as 
blatantly hypocritical, which would defeat the purpose of making the argument in the first 
place.”); Richard H. McAdams, Resentment, Excuse and Norms, in The Hart-Fuller 
Debate in the Twenty-First Century 249, 253 (Peter Cane ed., 2010) (discussing norm 
internalization and noting “it is difficult to resist applying one’s normative beliefs 
concerning the behavior of others to one’s own behavior”). 
158. Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in Deliberative Democracy 97, 
104 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) [hereinafter Elster, Deliberation] (emphasis omitted); see also 
Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 Int’l Org. 1, 23 
(2000) (referring to same basic mechanism as “argumentative self-entrapment”).  
159. See Fallon, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 6, at 1002 (“[E]xternal 
constraints not only reinforce, but also help shape, officials’ perceptions of their 
obligations.”). 
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not just because it would yield success in the pursuit of his interests in-
dependent of law, but also because being perceived to act lawfully is itself 
part of what he wants from his presidency.160 
Still, to say that legality is partially constitutive of an actor’s interests 
is not necessarily to say that legal dialogue is a constraint. Law could have 
a rhetorical salience (like appeals to fairness, or “the good”) without 
imposing any real constraint if any position could be defended as lawful. 
For it to be a constraint, legal dialogue must be subject to some validity 
or at least plausibility limits.161 This returns to some of the points made 
above with respect to the internalization of legal norms: Even if the goal 
is merely to establish the plausibility of a legal position (as opposed to its 
being consistent with the best view of the law), law acts as a constraint if 
the norms of legal reasoning or professional responsibility impose at least 
some barriers.162  
Admittedly, the law in many areas is open-ended and malleable, and 
arguments that might once have seemed beyond the pale can (perhaps 
in response to political or policy preferences) come to be accepted as 
plausible. This may be especially so for questions of executive power un-
likely to be addressed by a court, because the absence of a final judicial 
arbiter may leave the substance of the law more uncertain and subject to 
competing characterizations. But it would be a significant—and we 
believe unwarranted—leap to conclude that the law is so manipulable 
that legal dialogue imposes no constraints on the President whatsoever.  
Of course, this analysis does not necessarily yield the conclusion that 
the constraints associated with legal dialogue are robust. The relative 
strength of such constraints can be determined only through difficult 
empirical work. Moreover, the degree of this constraint probably de-
pends on the relative strength of other institutions. In the United States, 
it is likely that the existence of institutions such as a free press, an 
organized bar, an extensive university system, and an active NGO com-
munity enhance the constraint imposed by the salience of law in public 
dialogue. That constraint would presumably be weaker in a country with-
                                                                                                                 
160. Cf. Thomas P. Crocker, Presidential Power and Constitutional Responsibility, 52 
B.C. L. Rev. 1551, 1555 (2011) (“Certain conceptions of how to exercise power are part of 
the settled grammar of each office. In addition to these role-specific constraints, a 
president is also bound by the virtues and excellences that define what it means to fulfill 
the office’s duties well.”). 
161. Cf. Elster, Deliberation, supra note 158, at 104. 
162. See Levinson, Parchment, supra note 14, at 709 (arguing notions of legal 
plausibility “can serve to narrow the range of political disagreement on some issues and to 
rule some options off the table”); see also Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in 
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Legal Educ. 518, 526 (1986) (“[L]aw 
constrains as a physical medium constrains—you can’t do absolutely anything you want 
with a pile of bricks, and what you can do depends on how many you have, as well as your 
other circumstances.”). 
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out such institutions, and might approach zero in a dictatorship that 
simply mouthed legal platitudes without any risk of criticism from 
skeptical audiences. The point is simply that, at least with respect to the 
U.S. presidency, the phenomenon of extensive legal dialogue is both 
suggestive of, and plausibly a contributing factor to, some degree of 
constraint. 
D. Libya and “Hostilities” 
In order to make the discussion in the preceding sections more 
concrete while also identifying some of the difficulties with attempting to 
isolate the effect of law on presidential action, this Part concludes by 
considering a recent episode, mentioned earlier, that is thought by many 
to involve clear presidential illegality. It involves the Obama 
Administration’s treatment of the War Powers Resolution in connection 
with the 2011 military operation in Libya. Under the terms of the 
Resolution, military operations rising to the level of “hostilities” must 
cease (or at least be drawn down to the point that they are no longer 
hostilities) within sixty days if not authorized by Congress.163 Distinct 
from the question of the President’s authority to initiate the Libya opera-
tion without congressional authorization,164 the question here was 
whether the operation constituted “hostilities” as used in the Resolution 
and thus was subject to its sixty-day cutoff.  
The Obama Administration answered no. Although the operation 
ultimately lasted longer than sixty days and was never authorized by 
Congress, the Administration insisted that such authorization was un-
necessary under the War Powers Resolution because the operation did 
not constitute “hostilities.”165 In testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh 
placed heavy reliance upon a 1975 letter to Congress from the then-State 
Department Legal Adviser and Defense Department General Counsel. 
That letter stated that the Executive Branch understood “hostilities” to 
refer to “a situation in which units of the U.S. armed forces are actively 
engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces,” but 
not to include “irregular or infrequent violence which may occur in a 
                                                                                                                 
163. 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2006).  
164. See supra text accompanying note 33.  
165. See Koh Statement, supra note 151, at 14–16. Press reports claimed that OLC 
had reached the conclusion that the Libya operation did constitute “hostilities,” but that 
the White House decided not to adhere to that position. E.g., Charlie Savage, 2 Top 
Lawyers Lose Argument on War Power, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2011, at A1. One of us has 
raised serious concerns about the process by which that decision was reached, especially if 
it did not grant OLC’s legal views the presumptive authoritativeness that they are 
customarily accorded. See Morrison, Libya, supra note 100, at 66–74.  
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particular area.”166 Koh asserted that President Obama was “operating 
within this longstanding tradition of executive branch interpretation” 
when he concluded that the Libya operation—which involved 
voluminous bombing but little if any exchanges of fire with enemy 
forces—did not rise to the level of “hostilities.”167 
The Obama Administration’s position has been met with widespread 
criticism. Some academics have taken it to be a clear example of presi-
dential illegality.168 Many in Congress also condemned it.169 Yet at the 
same time there was no serious effort in Congress to force the President 
to comply with the letter of the Resolution.170  
How, then, should this episode be understood? One possibility is 
that the Obama Administration simply violated the Resolution’s sixty-day 
cutoff requirement, and that neither Congress nor the public at large saw 
fit to impose any sanction for the violation. On that view, this would 
appear to be a clear instance of law’s failure to constrain. Of course, even 
if that is the best understanding of what happened, it would not show 
that the President is generally unconstrained by law. Virtually every 
                                                                                                                 
166. Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, and Martin R. 
Hoffmann, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., to Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Int’l Sec. & Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Int’l Relations (June 3, 1975), in War 
Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation at Phnom 
Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Sec. & Scientific Affairs of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 
39 (1975) [hereinafter Leigh & Hoffman Letter]; see also Koh Statement, supra note 151, 
at 11 (quoting Leigh & Hoffman Letter, supra). 
167. Koh Statement, supra note 151, at 14. 
168. See, e.g., Schauer, Political Risks, supra note 93, at 90 (“[I]t seems more than 
plausible to treat [the Obama Administration’s argument that the Libya operation did not 
constitute ‘hostilities’ under the War Powers Resolution] as so weak as to permit the claim 
that the actions simply violated the law in a straightforward way.”); see also Libya and War 
Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 45–46 (2011) 
(statement of Louis Fisher, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute) (arguing Obama 
Administration violated War Powers Resolution).  
169. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, ‘A Lot of this Fuss is Politics,’ Wash. Post, June 
30, 2011, at A4 (noting congressional disapproval of White House’s interpretation); David 
A. Fahrenthold, Legislators Call Obama’s Action on Libya Illegal, Wash. Post, May 26, 
2011, at A6 (noting bipartisan disagreement with White House’s interpretation). 
170. A resolution that would have directed the President to remove U.S. forces from 
Libya within 15 days was defeated in the House on a vote of 265-148, and, on the same day, 
another resolution expressing opposition to the use of ground forces in Libya passed the 
House on a vote of 268-145. Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL33532, War 
Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance 13 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL33532.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). A few weeks later, a 
resolution that would have authorized the Libyan operations was defeated in the House by 
a vote of 295-123. Id. at 14. The full Senate did not hold any votes on resolutions 
concerning the Libya operation. Ten members of the House of Representatives sued 
President Obama, claiming that he was violating both the Constitution and the War 
Powers Resolution, but the case was dismissed for lack of standing. Kucinich v. Obama, 
821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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constraint has its limiting case, and the constellation of countervailing 
nonlegal considerations at work in the Libya episode may simply have 
been too much for the law to withstand.171  
Moreover, even if there were presidential illegality in this case, that 
fact alone would not mean that law failed to play any constraining role. 
Instead, this might be a situation where law’s constraining effect had 
more to do with requiring reasonable or plausible legal argumentation. 
Given its claimed fidelity to the 1975 Executive Branch letter to 
Congress, the Obama Administration’s position, even if ultimately un-
persuasive as an account of the best understanding of “hostilities,” might 
at least be plausible.172 If the Administration felt compelled to have a 
plausible legal account of consistency with the Resolution, then the 
Resolution might have had some constraining effect even if it was vio-
lated.173  
In addition, the law might have had a more observable constraining 
effect if the Libya operation had been less successful operationally. If, 
instead of quickly toppling the Qadhafi regime, U.S. forces had become 
mired in a protracted conflict, it is quite possible that the legal questions 
surrounding the operation would have intensified. In that circumstance, 
the potential illegality of the operation might have increased its political 
costliness to the Obama Administration.174 Although those costs did not 
materialize in this particular situation, that does not mean they would fail 
to constrain in a different situation where operational success was in 
more serious doubt. More generally, a potentially interactive relationship 
among operational success, political cost, and legality does not mean that 
the last factor imposes no constraint; it merely specifies circumstances in 
which that constraint is most likely to engage. Again, to emphasize a 
point that runs throughout this Essay, the fact that the law in this area is 
interrelated with politics does not show that it is unimportant. 
It is also worth emphasizing that, despite a low likelihood of judicial 
involvement in the issue, the Obama Administration offered public legal 
                                                                                                                 
171. Clearly, there were some distinctive features to this episode that might have 
made noncompliance more likely than in other circumstances. Those features include the 
fact that some presidential administrations have raised doubts about the constitutionality 
of the War Powers Resolution, as well as the low likelihood that Congress would impose 
any serious sanctions for violating the Resolution in the Libya operation.  
172. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
112th Cong. 48 (2011) (statement of Peter J. Spiro, Professor of Law, Temple University 
Beasley School of Law), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/libya.pdf 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).  
173. Cf. Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, At Deadline, U.S. Seeks to Continue War 
in Libya, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2011, at A10 (reporting “the Obama legal team is now trying 
to come up with a plausible theory for why continued participation by the United States 
does not violate the [Resolution]”).  
174. See Schauer, Political Risks, supra note 93, at 84–85. 
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justifications, based heavily on arguments from historical practice, for the 
Libya operation. OLC issued an extensive legal opinion in support of the 
legality of the initial deployment of force, and high-level Administration 
officials testified in support of the legality of continuing the operation 
past the sixty-day point. If law were playing no constraining role either 
internally or externally, it is not clear why the Administration would have 
made those efforts, instead of simply arguing that the operation consti-
tuted good policy. After all, the legal arguments were not costless: They 
required effort to construct and exposed the Administration to criticism 
from those who disagreed with the analysis.  
To be sure, the precise way that the Administration defended the 
legality of its position on the “hostilities” question raised concerns. Press 
reports suggested that views on the question were divided within the 
Administration, and that OLC (and others) apparently thought the 
operation did constitute hostilities and thus was subject to the sixty-day 
cutoff.175 Especially given its reliance upon a written opinion from OLC 
to defend the legality of the initial deployment, the Administration’s 
decision to reject OLC’s views on the “hostilities” question and to rely 
instead on the State Department Legal Adviser to defend the contrary 
view appears opportunistic—and worrisome to those who value the tradi-
tion of treating OLC’s legal conclusions as presumptively binding within 
the executive branch.176 The key point here, however, is that the 
Administration did not simply defend the continuation of the Libya 
operation on humanitarian or other policy or political grounds. Instead, 
even in departing from the apparent views of OLC, it went to considera-
ble lengths to provide a detailed legal defense of its position. The 
particulars of that defense may have been less than convincing, but its 
very existence highlights the apparent salience of the law in this context. 
Given that the Obama Administration was able to continue the Libya 
operation while defending its definition of “hostilities,” its definition 
might become accepted going forward. Especially in areas like this, 
where institutional practice plays such a central role, the best under-
standing of the law is not necessarily fixed and unchanging. As a result, 
actions supported by minimally plausible legal defenses might over time 
be understood to exert a gravitational pull on the best understanding of 
the law. Such a possibility does not eliminate the prospect of legal 
constraint. It does, however, highlight a potential drawback to a practice-
based approach to law, at least on issues of presidential power. Put 
simply, practice can sometimes sap the law of its constraining power.  
That said, it should be noted that the Obama Administration went to 
great lengths to tie its conclusion that the Libya operation did not entail 
                                                                                                                 
175. See supra note 165.  
176. See generally Morrison, Libya, supra note 100 (discussing this “process” 
concern). 
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“hostilities” to the specific facts of that situation.177 One might question 
the legitimacy of artificial attempts to confine the sweep of a precedent at 
the very point it is issued.178 Still, the Obama Administration’s context-
specific approach may make it harder for future administrations to 
generalize from the Libya episode. And again, if law were imposing no 
constraint whatsoever on the Obama Administration’s approach to the 
issue, it is not clear why the Administration would have bothered to limit 
its claim in this way. 
CONCLUSION 
Some commentators have suggested that presidential authority has 
become “unbounded” by law, and is now governed only or primarily by 
politics. At the same time, there has been growing skepticism about the 
ability of the familiar political checks on presidential power to work in 
any systematic or reliable fashion. This Essay has attempted to under-
stand more precisely what it means for the President to be constrained by 
law, and to outline possible mechanisms for such legal constraint. In 
doing so, it has resisted any sharp distinction between politics and law 
and has identified ways in which the two likely operate together. Politics 
and law are best understood not as mutually exclusive but as interactive 
in a range of complicated ways, sometimes in tandem and sometimes in 
opposition. Such interaction does not mean that law is unimportant or 
unconstraining, just as it does not mean that politics are unimportant or 
unconstraining. 
Ultimately, the extent to which law constrains the President is an 
empirical question. In offering illustrations of how law might constrain 
presidential power, this Essay has sought to make the analysis more 
concrete, not to make systematic claims about what is happening in prac-
tice. There are a number of challenges to developing such claims. First, 
the problem of observational equivalence can make it difficult to dis-
entangle law-based explanations for a given action from various non-law-
based reasons for the same action. In some situations, this may simply be 
                                                                                                                 
177. Harold Koh stressed that (1) “U.S. forces are playing a constrained and 
supporting role in a NATO-led multinational civilian protection operation, which is 
implementing a U.N. Security Council Resolution tailored to that limited purpose,” (2) 
“our operations have not involved U.S. casualties or a threat of significant U.S. casualties,” 
(3) “U.S. military operations have not involved the presence of U.S. ground troops, or any 
significant chance of escalation into a broader conflict,” and (4) “[t]his situation does not 
present the kind of ‘full military engagement[] with which the [War Powers] Resolution is 
primarily concerned.’” Koh contended that, “[h]ad any of these elements been absent in 
Libya, or present in different degrees, a different legal conclusion might have been 
drawn.” See Koh Statement, supra note 151, at 7–11. 
178. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the 
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally 
presents many complexities.”). 
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the result of the fact that both legal and extralegal norms point in the 
same direction. In others, certain non-law-based reasons may themselves 
be affected by law. The sense that something is immoral, for example, 
might be based in part on a sense that it is unlawful (and vice versa).179 
Second, as discussed earlier, disputes over the content and meaning 
of the law often make it unclear whether the legal norm has been 
followed. If the law in a given area is so malleable or undeveloped as to 
admit of any interpretation that the regulated actor might prefer, it is 
difficult to see how the law could be said to impose any meaningful 
constraint. Yet it can be difficult to separate such cases from cases of 
legitimate but bounded disagreement over the law. Practice-based law is 
probably more likely to suffer from this difficulty than law grounded in 
clear textual provisions, especially if there is little prospect of authori-
tative judicial review. The problem is compounded in circumstances 
where the law-complying standard to which the relevant actors are held 
does not follow the “best” view of the law but merely ensures that there is 
a reasonable or plausible legal basis for their actions.  
Third, focusing on the law’s impact on actions actually taken by the 
President or other executive actors threatens to obscure the potentially 
much broader universe of actions not taken. Identifying relevant 
“nonevents,” however, is extremely difficult. Moreover, even when a 
given nonevent is identifiable, the reason why it did not transpire may be 
elusive. Although legal considerations might explain why certain actions 
were not taken or even seriously considered, the fact that a forgone 
action would have been legally controversial or even indefensible does 
not mean it was forgone for that reason. Furthermore, government 
officials do not typically provide public explanations for why they are not 
taking particular actions, and even when they do, the explanation may be 
self-serving. Internal deliberations relating to nonactions may be 
especially difficult to access with respect to the presidency, where norms 
of confidentiality will often apply.   
Notwithstanding these difficulties, some empirical investigation 
should be possible in this area. It would be useful to consider, for 
example, modern instances in which Congress has resisted presidential 
action and framed its resistance in explicitly legal terms. Of course, the 
mere presence of an objection articulated in legal terms does not mean 
that the law was the principal motivating factor. As explained elsewhere, 
congressional resistance to presidential action is heavily affected by 
                                                                                                                 
179. See, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel Walker, Laws and Moral Judgments, 30 
Sociometry 410, 412 (1967) (“Laws may often be taken as implying a social consensus, and 
this implied consensus could influence attitudes toward the behavior that is the subject of 
the laws.”); cf. Hart, supra note 112, at 7 (“Not only do law and morals share a vocabulary 
so that there are both legal and moral obligations, duties, and rights; but all municipal 
legal systems reproduce the substance of certain fundamental moral requirements.”). 
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political partisanship.180 Especially in times of divided government, con-
gressional resistance that is articulated in legal terms may be principally 
motivated by partisan concerns. When members of Congress from the 
President’s own party join in a legal objection, however, it might be fair 
to infer that concern for the law itself provides a greater part of the 
motivation for the objection.  
In addition to being intertwined with partisanship, legally articulated 
objections by members of Congress are probably more likely to occur 
when the objectors disagree with the action as a matter of policy. As 
political science literature has made clear, a significant motivation for 
members of Congress is reelection, which means that they tend to be 
focused more on their constituents’ policy preferences than on 
Congress’s institutional prerogatives.181 Still, there may be instances 
where legal concerns stand apart from policy considerations, such as 
where Congress resists presidential action on legal grounds but 
subsequently approves the action once its legal concerns are resolved. 
(Senatorial insistence that arms control agreements be concluded as 
Article II treaties, discussed in Part III.B, is a potential example.) 
The more fundamental point, however, is that the mere existence of 
partisan or policy motivations to resist a particular presidential action 
does not disqualify congressional resistance articulated in legal terms 
from counting as an instance of legal constraint. Law, politics, and policy 
are best viewed not as mutually exclusive but as overlapping, interactive 
domains. For example, as discussed above, the political costs of un-
popular or unsuccessful presidential actions may go up with their 
perceived illegality. Certainly it is possible to think of examples—the 
Iran-Contra scandal, for instance—that might illustrate such a 
phenomenon.182 If so, then even if legally articulated congressional 
resistance is entirely opportunistic, the ability of Congress to marshal 
credible legal objections can produce a form of constraint.183 Empirical 
                                                                                                                 
180. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 443. 
181. See id. at 442. 
182. The Iran-Contra scandal involved the secret facilitation by the Reagan 
Administration of arms sales to Iran in an effort to secure the release of hostages, and the 
diversion of some of the funds from the sales to support rebels in Nicaragua, despite a 
statutory ban on such support. After the scheme was discovered in 1986, the Reagan 
Administration suffered substantial political damage. See R.W. Apple Jr., The Iran Affair: 
A Presidency Damaged, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at A1. Reagan’s popularity rebounded, 
however, before the end of his presidency. 
183. A similar observation might be made about the link between law and policy. In 
deciding on a course of action, Presidents presumably seek to avoid policy failure. Legal 
uncertainty can potentially affect this calculation by creating a higher risk of such failure. 
In the debt ceiling debate, for example, the legal uncertainty generated by unilateral 
presidential action could have contributed to difficulties in the bond markets, which in 
turn could have harmed the U.S. economy. If legal considerations make policy failure 
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investigation of this sort of hypothesized exacerbation of political cost 
(through the use of opinion polls, for example) would be useful. 
Internal constraints on presidential action will be more difficult to 
verify empirically, in part because of norms of confidentiality 
surrounding executive branch decisionmaking. Still, to the extent that 
internal accounts of such decisionmaking are or become available, they 
can be very instructive. To take an example mentioned earlier, it would 
be useful to know more about the legal deliberations in 2011 (and again 
in late 2012 and early 2013) associated with the Obama Administration’s 
decision not to attempt unilaterally to exceed the statutory debt ceiling. 
With the passage of time, the details of such internal deliberations are 
more likely to be disclosed,184 although there are of course dangers that 
after-the-fact recollections will be self-serving or otherwise distorted. 
Identifiable examples of resistance by executive branch attorneys to con-
templated presidential action—for example, in the form of publicly 
disclosed OLC opinions185—can also be at least suggestive of constraints 
on particular issues.186 
In sum, although there are a number of obstacles to pursuing 
systematic empirical investigation of law’s constraining effect in this area, 
they may not be insurmountable. As a first step, successful empirical 
research depends on asking the right questions. To that end, this Essay 
has sought to clarify the primary analytical issues and to articulate plausi-
ble hypotheses that might help frame future research.  
  
                                                                                                                 
more likely, they can affect the President’s decisionmaking even if he has not internalized 
the legal norms as such. 
184. As noted above, an informal report from a former Obama Administration 
official suggests that law did indeed operate as a constraint. See Jarmul, supra note 83. 
185. A 2010 memorandum outlining best practices for the provision of legal advice 
by OLC embraces “the presumption that [OLC] should make its significant opinions fully 
and promptly available to the public.” 2010 OLC Best Practices Memorandum, supra note 
130, at 5. In contrast, the 2005 memorandum that the 2010 memorandum replaced 
acknowledged no comparable presumption and stressed instead the importance of 
“[m]aintaining the confidentiality of OLC opinions.” 2005 OLC Best Practices 
Memorandum, supra note 130, at 4. It is unclear, however, whether OLC has in fact 
disclosed its opinions at a greater rate in recent years than it did previously.  
186. Cf. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 32, at 1718–19 (noting 
various such examples as well as examples that seem to point in other direction, and 
explaining why simply counting “yes” rate in written OLC opinions will not yield fully 
accurate picture of extent to which OLC constrains White House). 
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